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1. SUMMARY 
For the last 30 years Mongolian agricultural policy has followed a dual approach. The traditional 
rural economy based on semi-nomadic pastoralism has been augmented by the creation of State 
Farms primarily for the purpose of crop production. These units were modelled on the Soviet 
Sovkhozy pattern i.e. wholly state-owned and highly centralised and were developed with assistance 
from other members of the CMEA, principally the USSR. By the end of the 1980s over 80% of the 
cropped land was within the State Farm sector. Although some fodder is produced the principal role 
of the State farms is the production of crops for human consumption and dominant amongst these is 
wheat, accounting for 75% of the total annually cropped land (about 800,000 ha). 
The level of domestic wheat production was driven by the requirement for self-sufficiency. 
Population growth and increasing urbanisation since the second world war brought with them a 
growing demand for wheat. Because of insufficient wheat production within the CMEA as a whole 
and the shortage of hard currency required for the purchase of wheat on world markets, substantial 
resources were devoted to improving domestic production. Both the area sown and the yields rose 
substantially during this period of expansion. 
Cereal production in Mongolia is risky because of climatic factors. The country has a severe 
continental climate with a growing season of typically 100 days. Precipitation in the main cropping 
areas is around 300 mm per annum which necessitates management systems (including clean fallow) 
to conserve moisture. Average yields during the 1980s were around 1.2 tonnes per hectare. 
The establishment of these large scale enterprises has meant a significant increase in the level of 
imports of agriculture inputs. Because Mongolia does not produce fertiliser or sprays nor assembles 
farm machinery, these items had to be imported from other CMEA countries. The coupling of the 
Mongolian economy to that of the USSR in particular was very close and the degree of 
interdependency and economic specialisation mirrored that of the republics of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU). Trade was, and remains, vital to the Mongolian economy. 
Output targets (state orders) for each farm were set by central planners and the entire operation was 
administered by officials within the Ministry of Agriculture. This provided little opportunity for 
decision making at farm level with the result that farmer innovation tended to be suppressed. 
Despite the introduction of new mechanised production systems the overall productivity has been 
disappointingly low. Capital productivity is particularly poor. The trade agreements and pricing 
systems in operation tended to hide this. The materials balance approach to resource allocation 
simply ensured that factors sufficient for the attainment of a prescribed output level would be 
allocated. Attention was not directed to the optimal allocation between production possibilities nor 
the need to improve the efficiency of production. Inefficient production persisted due to the 
existence of a soft-budget constraint i.e. the willingness of the State to subsidise loss-making 
enterprises and an economic system that did not provide the incentives to attain optimal resource 
allocation. 
Reform of the economy began in the late 1980s inspired by Gorbechev's programme of perestroika in 
the USSR although little was achieved until the collapse of the socialist regimes in the CMEA and the 
USSR itself forced the pace of change. The withdrawal of economic assistance from the USSR has 
been very damaging to the Mongolian economy. One of the most significant effects has been 
requirement, since January 1991, to pay for all imports in hard currency. Theoretically the prices of 
these goods are based on those in world markets. However there are considerable differences 
between the prices of Russian-supplied imports and those from other sources. This may be in part a 
result of quality differences especially in the case of machinery. In practice bilateral barter trade 
(involving minerals) has been possible but it is often unpredictable and essential supplies cannot be 
guaranteed. The economy of the former Soviet Union (FSU) itself has undergone major upheavals 
and these effects are transmitted to countries such as Mongolia which are dependent on its trade. 
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Imports of fuel, fertiliser and machinery fell precipitously during 1991 and have not as yet recovered 
their former levels. Wheat production has understandably fallen over this period although the full 
effects of the input shortages are yet to be felt. 
Reform measures within Mongolia are attempting to introduce a market economy and to privatise 
state and co-operative enterprises. To date this has been somewhat haphazard as the country 
attempts to both pursue internal reform and cope with major external shocks. Privatisation of the 
State Farms is proceeding with various forms of business emerging. The farms are not well suited to 
the creation of small units and many have a emerged as small companies in which the workers are 
shareholders. 
In order to facilitate understanding of this sector, a simple model of wheat production systems has 
been developed. The approach involves identifying and costing the factors of production with an 
emphasis on separating domestic and imported tradables. The impact of divergences can then be 
assessed. The prevailing situation in 1992 shows negative private profitability if the cost of 
maintaining the pre-1991 machinery complement is included. If this is excluded (as has been the 
case) then small private profits are possible in the short term in the better wheat growing areas. 
With regard to social costs, there are significant divergences which create negative protection in 
output markets and positive protection in input markets. By the autumn of 1992 price liberalisation 
was only partially completed. The price of flour along with other essentials was fixed by the State 
which continued to set procurement targets for basic commodities. This official price therefore 
implies a nominal protection coefficient (NPC) of 0.17. Two factors influence this situation. First, 
the Tugrik is obviously overvalued however the degree to which this is the case is difficult to 
estimate. Secondly the calculation of an import parity price for wheat was hindered by the lack of 
reliable data on transport costs between Tianjin (on the Chinese Pacific coast) and Ulaan Baatar. The 
overvalued exchange rate provides positive protection in input markets as the domestic price of 
inputs is calculated using the official rate. The net effect of these measures is an effective protection 
coefficient estimated to be 0.02. This reflects the very low value-added at financial prices. Actual 
levels of procurement by the State have been lower than hoped for principally because of lower 
production but also because of increasing leakage into parallel markets. 
Excessively high transport costs importing via China presently underpin the case for growing wheat. 
If the costs of transhipment from Tianjin to Ulaan Baatar were to fall to $40 per tonne a yield of 1.2 
tonnes per ha would be required to provide (low) social profits. Furthermore, were the costs of inputs 
from the FSU to rise as a result, for example, of increased competitiveness then short term 
profitability would decline sharply. More likely perhaps will be the need to turn increasingly to other 
sources for the supply of inputs if the situation in the FSU further deteriorates. The costs of such 
goods would be higher (as would the quality). Though the long term net result of the two effects is 
difficult to predict, in the short term the higher costs would be felt immediately whereas any 
productivity gains would take longer to achieve. Given that this yield level is the pre-transformation 
average, it is undoubtedly the case that large areas of land would show negative social profitability 
and a cessation of production (or a switch to other crops) would be advisable. 
The critical issue therefore is whether the goal of economic efficiency is best served by devoting the 
current land area to wheat production. The shortage of high quality winter feed is seen as a major 
constraint upon livestock production and it is this which offers some insights into the other 
production possibilities. The demand for fodder is derived from the level of livestock production 
which has been and remains an important export. If the value of livestock exports increases then the 
demand for (and price of) fodder will also increase. If domestic prices are fully liberalised and an 
internal market for livestock feed continues to develop then a switch to fodder production may be 
attractive to many farmers. Improvements in transport systems will accelerate this process as they 
will raise the farm-gate price of exported livestock products and lower the cost of imported wheat. 
This report concentrates on the analysis of a single, albeit important, commodity - wheat. Further 
work along similar lines is needed to assist in the development of policy alternatives in the arable 
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crop sector. The following conclusions and recommendations are therefore offered on the basis of 
the work undertaken so far in this study. 
• The existing production systems exhibit serious inefficiencies. With carefully targeted and 
appropriate technical assistance productivity gains are possible this would ease the pressure on 
scarce arable land. Areas identified for consideration include seed technology, fallow 
management, agro-chemical spraying and harvest and post-harvest losses. 
• In some cases despite such gains it may nevertheless be better to switch to alternative crops. This 
would then necessitate importing a proportion of the wheat requirement. This will be 
worthwhile if the foreign exchange earnings from the resources freed for wheat production are 
greater than the costs of importing the equivalent quantity of wheat. Further work will be needed 
to establish the situations in which this is the case. Multi-commodity farm budgets in which 
livestock feed is a component offer one possible route to this end. 
s What is likely in practice is that farming systems in which both cereal crops and fodder crops 
feature will become more prevalent. Much of the wheat land is monocultural. Preliminary work 
by the Asian Development Bank in planning a livestock feeds project suggests that wheat yields 
could be improved when combined with leguminous (and other) forage crops in rotations. The 
result may be a net loss in wheat output but this is more than compensated for by the value of 
fodder produced. Again these systems will need to be carefully budgeted as well as being 
assessed for technical viability and acceptability on the part of farmers. 
• All of the preceding suggestions will require a effective research and extension service which 
will, in the short term, require funding from sources outwith agriculture. 
• Finally, agricultural policy will be crucial in determining the direction and pace of adjustment. 
Price divergences tend to lead sub-optimal resource allocation. An insidious form of intervention 
can arise from the actions of state and parastatal agents in the agriculture and food chain. 
Monopolistic (and monopsonistic) positions allow such bodies to influence the range of options 
open to producers and to create a system of state orders by proxy. This tends to drive products 
into parallel markets or possibly acts as an incentive to cease production altogether. There is 
therefore an urgent need to build institutional capacity in agricultural policy analysts in 
Mongolia. The agricultural sector requires a well thought out and coherent set of policy 
objectives and instruments. This can only arise when the sector is viewed as a whole and in the 
context of those sectors on which it depends and vice versa. As the single most important aid 
initiative in this field, the ADB Feeds Improvement Project should consider the impact on cereal 
production of improvements fodder production as the two are inextricably linked. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
The series of studies in the Policy Alternatives for Livestock Development (PALD) programme have, to 
date, concentrated on the livestock sector of Mongolia. However it has been clear from the start of 
this project that a study of this type would need to encompass the agricultural sector in its entirety 
because of the inter-relationships between agricultural activities and the competition for the relatively 
scarce resource of good arable land. Although the land area of Mongolia amounts to some 160 
million hectares, the land classified as arable is only 1.4 million ha and some of this is not well suited 
to long term cultivation. Land use is dominated by extensive pastoral systems, accounting for about 
80% of the total area. 
This latter reason is significant because of the fodder requirements of the livestock activities and the 
general shortage of good fodder for these animals. Of the 1.4 million ha of arable land available 
around 800,000 ha is cropped annually with nearly 600,000 ha fallowed. Approximately 75% of this 
area is given over to wheat production making it the single most important arable crop. An initial 
assessment of the situation suggests that, because of the poor performance of many of these wheat 
growing activities, there is an argument that economic efficiency goals would be better served by a 
transfer of resources into those activities in which the country enjoys a comparative advantage. This 
study attempts to determine to what extent such a proposition is justified in the prevailing economic 
conditions in Mongolia. 
This report first provides a cursory overview of the current state of the Mongolian economy and the 
changes that are currently taking place during this period of transition. This is followed by a more 
detailed study of the production of wheat in Mongolia with particular emphasis on the agronomy and 
regional variations in performance. Chapter 4 is concerned with an analysis of some of the problems 
that beset the present methods of wheat production, in particular the reasons for poor performance 
and losses and the brief look at some of the environmental issues. Farm management problems are 
the subject of the next chapter. Chapter 6 is devoted to an economic analysis of wheat production as 
is stands at the moment. The model is described in detail with particular emphasis on the data 
sources and the assumptions used in assembly . Some results of the model are presented in chapter 7 
with conclusions and recommendations following in chapters 8 and 9. 
An important component of this study is a computer spreadsheet model that describes the 
wheat production system. The model has been automated and documented to make it 
accessible to readers who may wish to pursue the subject in greater detail. At present it is 
available in Microsoft Excel and Quattro Pro but conversion to other spreadsheet packages 
should be a relatively easy task and is available upon request from the author.1 
The purpose of this study is to define the parameters of the problem and provide a framework for 
policy analysis on the issue. In order to do this it is important to understand the changes in the 
institutional and economic environment over the last two to three years and the organisation of the 
economy during the years of central planning as they create some particular problems for agricultural 
policy analysts. Throughout the years of the command economy the price system was entirely 
administered and, as a result, prices reflected neither scarcity value nor social utility. Current 
methods of assessing economic efficiency rely on identifying and correcting for distortions arising 
from interventions on the part of governments in what would be otherwise market-based systems. 
Within the command economies decisions about resource allocation were taken at government level 
and usually without reference to prices. As a result producers had little control over the activity mix 
or methods of production at farm level. Attainment of the prescribed physical output targets was the 
overriding aim of the farm managers and profitability, as it is understood in a Western context, was 
generally of secondary importance. 
This study attempts to capture the technical and economic nature of this important commodity system 
during the time of economic transformation. The aim is to provide a basis for evaluating existing 
1Neil Chalmers, MLURI, Craigiebuckler, Aberdeen, AB9 2QJ, UK. Phone: (+44) 224318611, fax: 311556, 
E-mail (Internet): NAC@MLURI.SARI.AC.UK 
Wheat production In Mongolia: an economic analysis ' Page 43 
forms of land use and identifying how and where change would result in economic benefits for 
Mongolians. These are difficult days for Mongolia as the country struggles to rediscover its identity 
and recover from a series of economic shocks. It is hoped that this report can contribute something 
of value in helping to chart the course ahead. 
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3. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the present predicament of the Mongolian wheat production sector it is useful 
to consider the organisation of the economy of the whole over during the socialist period. The 
Agricultural Sector background paper (Sloane et al, 1991) provides a comprehensive overview of 
agriculture as a whole. Other works provide more detail on the wider economic and political 
situation of the country2. The Mongolian economy has a very narrow base, concentrating on primary 
products, most importantly minerals (the main source of foreign exchange is copper concentrate) and 
livestock products. There is very little manufacturing industry and so most manufactures and 
consumer goods were and are still, imported from other (former) CMEA countries, most notably the 
FSU. As a result the economy was quite open and integrated into the wider planning activities of the 
CMEA. The influence of external advisors was pervasive with every industrial sector and government 
department being organised along Soviet lines. Indeed, Mongolia was often referred to by western 
observers as the sixteenth republic in all but name. This paradigm is valuable in that it helps to 
elucidate the present predicament facing the country. There are a number of parallels with the 
member states of the CIS, the former Soviet republics. The degree of geographical specialisation, 
acknowledging the principle of comparative advantage, has been considerable. For a time this 
arrangement worked quite effectively, particularly as it served the geo-political interests of the USSR 
in connection with its relations with China. It is tempting to speculate that lying behind the 
assistance to Mongolia was an desire to ensure that Mongolia remained safely within the political and 
economic orbit of the USSR and to display to China the benefits of so doing. 
3.1. Recent History 
The Mongolian economy has been subjected to a number of serious shocks in recent years. The 
collapse of the CMEA and in particular the trading relations with the FSU has been very damaging to 
Mongolia. Various sources estimate that the assistance from the CMEA in financing the budget deficit 
during the 1980's amounted to 30-35% of GDP. The loss of this injection of economic aid has been 
very serious. In 1991 GDP fell by an estimated 15% in real terms. 1992 has also seen a further 
decline in output, believed to be in the region of 10%. Although the effect of this withdrawal differs 
throughout the economy there are a number of common features. Foreign exchange shortages have 
meant that the procurement of essential factors of production has been at best difficult and in many 
cases impossible. At the local level this problem has been often exacerbated by the collapse of the 
centralised ordering and distribution system with, as yet, no viable alternative to replace it. As a 
result the industrial sectors are presently undergoing a period of rapid disinvestment of a capital base 
which is already largely sub-standard and obsolete. The shortage of spare parts means that as 
machines fail they are not repaired but are taken out of use and are cannibalised in order to keep 
others operational. Neither are they able to obtain regular supplies of inputs such as fertiliser, fuel 
and sprays (in the case of crop farms). The overall effect of this is to further erode an already poor 
level of productivity. It is worth noting in this context that the State Farm sector shares much in 
common with light industry and many of the problems of the one apply equally to the other. 
3.2. Inflation 
The period of transition has brought with it serious price inflation. Prior to 1990 inflation was almost 
unknown as prices were centrally determined and administered. As price controls were eased 
inflation rose and much of the inflation in early 1992 were a direct consequence of price 
liberalisation. The increase in the consumer price index was estimated to be 130% during 1991. 
Inflation during 1992 appears to have been around 60% but the problem is still serious as Mongolia 
continues to allow its budgetary deficit to be financed by a growth in money supply. 
2The papers prepared for the International Seminar on Mongolia's Transition to a Market Economy: Evaluation, Problems and 
Proposals, (October 1992), provide a very comprehensive overview of the progress of economic transformation in Mongolia. More 
details can be obtained from the UNDP, Ulaanbaatar 
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For many the effects of inflation are particularly difficult. Employees of the State have seen their 
incomes fall precipitously in the last few years. Some businesses have been able to fair little better as 
the differential nature of inflation tends to squeeze already slim margins ever more tightly. One of 
the side effects of inflation has been the emergence of parallel markets in which barter or hard 
currency transactions predominate. Producers have also withheld produce from sale where this is 
possible because of the declining value of the Tugrik (with negative real interest rates for savers) and 
the lack of consumer goods for sale. The continued activities of the state in intervening in factor and 
product markets has exacerbated this problem. Because of these emergence of parallel markets, 
coinciding with an erosion in the established methods of data collection, it is very difficult to 
measure with precision many important economic indicators. 
3.3. Exchange Rates 
In common with the other member states of the CMEA, the Mongolian Tugrik was non-convertible 
currency. 
Table 1. Exchange rates, 1986-92 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Official rate (=US$ 1) 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 7 40 40 
Parallel rate 10 15 20 30 40 150 300 
The exchange rate at November 1992 was Tg 40 = US$ 1 although street rates were around 350 Tg. 
Despite several devaluations the Mongolian authorities have so far failed to reach the IMF target of no 
more than 90 Tg per dollar difference between the official and parallel rates. The persistence of an 
officially overvalued currency and the existence of multiple exchange rates continue hamper 
economic reform. This exchange rate policy has necessitated foreign exchange rationing, export 
licensing and rationing of imported materials, all of which have a distorting effect on the economy 
and seriously prejudice the market reform process. 
For calculations of social profitability it is important to have some measure of the shadow exchange 
rate. That the official rate is substantially over-valued is universally accepted. The parallel markets 
however almost certainly under-value the currency. The true market rate probably lies between these 
extremes. Work by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) on behalf of the Asian Development Bank 
suggests of rate of 150 Tugriks per US dollar as a market rate for the industrial sector3. In the absence 
of any superior information this rate has been used in calculations in this study. 
3.4. Price Control and State Orders 
Perhaps one of the most serious characteristics of this transition period is the uncertainty and 
volatility of government policy and its implementation at local level. The dismantling of the planned 
command system has created a vacuum which has promoted the attainment of short term goals and 
opportunism to a dominant position. For many emerging private businesses the economic 
environment is so unpredictable and hostile that long term planning appears a luxury that cannot be 
afforded. The external pressures on the Mongolian government from the donor agencies generally 
comprise a pattern of macroeconomic stabilisation measures designed to address the serious ills of 
the economy. In many cases these measures are perceived to run counter to the interests of particular 
groups within society and the result is, very often, a set of policy instruments which are compromised 
in their effectiveness because of failure to implement them in a consistent manner. 
There is also a more insidious difficulty in the reformation process. Mongolia has been a socialist 
state since the 1920's and before that a pastoral feudal society. There is consequently little 
3The work of the B C G Is not at present in the public domain and cannot therefore be cited. The author acknowledges the 
assistance of economists working in Ulaan Baatar for the contribution of this information and discussions on the subject. 
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understanding or tradition of the market economy as it is understood in the West. The immediate 
impact of this deficiency is that the country appears to exhibit many of the ills of market economies 
with very few of the benefits. This is a pattern that has best most of the former CMEA countries 
although it is interesting to note that the effect has been less pronounced some of the Eastern (more 
correctly "Central") European nations4. Murrel et al (1992) address these problems in relation to price 
reform. Their conclusions are noteworthy. In particular they identify a dissonance between the 
policy measures and their implementation at local level. The actions of local officials are often seen 
to be inconsistent with the stated policy objectives as laid down by government. Instead there has 
been a widespread tendency to see price controls as a "quick fix" for various political and economic 
problems both at local and indeed at national level. That the political and economic culture of the 
past has a profound influence on the present is widely accepted but identifying means of addressing 
this problem has proved to be much more difficult. This paper does not address itself to these issues 
directly but the reader is encouraged to pursue the subject further elsewhere. 
This matter has a direct bearing on the subject addressed in this paper because the farmers have to 
operate with the prevailing policy environment and will react accordingly. The evidence from the 
last two years affirms this. Unlike the pastoralists who to a certain extent have the capacity to 
insulate themselves from the adverse economic conditions, the arable farms are very dependent on 
imported inputs. Furthermore, because of the importance of wheat as a staple foodstuff, it has, until 
recently, been subject to price control to ensure affordable prices to consumers. The effect of this 
together with limited availability of highly priced inputs has been to put a squeeze on farm margins. 
The state order system enforces a rigidity that often undermines efficient resource allocation. State 
orders were still effective at the beginning of 1992. The plan for wheat for example included the 
production of 555,000 tonnes although the harvest appears to have been around 430,000 tonnes in 
total. This would provide around only 200,000 tonnes for flour milling, well short of the 
requirement. The prices at which procurement takes place have been well below the economic price 
and there is evidence of a growing trade in the unauthorised export of agricultural products thereby 
depriving the domestic processing industry of its raw materials and exacerbating the problem of food 
shortages, and the emergence of a parallel domestic market for agricultural products in which prices 
are four to five times that of the state price. 
The government has indicated its intention to remove all price controls, although this has so far 
proved difficult to achieve. During 1992 many agricultural products remained within the state order 
system, a measure deemed desirable to ensure supplies of essential products. Unfortunately the 
inadequacy of input supply together with the low output prices have tended to undermine this 
objective. 
3.5. Privatisation 
The auctioning of the State farms and cooperatives has been part of the first stage in the Mongolian 
privatisation. By the summer of 1992 over 75% of the State farms and 90% of the cooperatives had 
been transferred to private or semi-private ownership. Stable businesses forms have yet to emerge as 
former state farms split and then merge again as they attempt to identify a workable structure. Table 
2. below provides a summary of the restructuring as at November 1992. It is certain that this is no 
longer the case and many more changes are likely in the near future. The viability of businesses is a 
serious issue as there are many factors which militate the success of farm businesses forged from the 
former State Farms. To begin with they inherit the failings and deficiencies of the State Farms in the 
form of the technology of production and capital investment. These problems are elucidated 
4This is in no way meant to be an indictment of the Mongolians themselves merely a comment on the magnitude of the problem. 
Perhaps the most enduring impression of the current state of the nation is their ingenuous expectation of the benefits that will flow 
from economic reform although the emergence of a grow economically and socially disadvantaged sub-class is worrying. One of 
the features of the years of Soviet assistance was the tendency for the Soviets to run the country on behalf of the Mongolians 
thereby creating a dependency. The sudden removal of this assistance has left Mongolia with little choice other than to go it alone 
and attempt to build a viable economy. The analogy of an abandoned child is perhaps helpful in this context. A number of recent 
events point to the naivete and lack of experience in international business reinforcing the impression of vulnerability of the 
country. 
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elsewhere in this report. Secondly, there are very real deficiencies in management ability, of both a 
technical and financial nature. The statist system did not advance managerial skills at farm level and 
the new businesses face a very severe skills shortage. There is no extension service in that the 
technical was provided by the State Farm management team which included technical specialists 
such as agronomists and veterinarians. Thirdly, the State Farms do not lend themselves to easy 
dismantling for the purpose of creating small businesses. The investment in fixed capital reflects the 
large-scale, centralised approach of the former regime. Thus State Farms have more in common with 
small townships based around an industrial centre than farms in the sense that the term is understood 
in the West. In many cases the creation of small, family based units is impossible and the emerging 
business form usually owes much to the former brigade structure (salaa). 
Given the difficulties of establishing viable businesses under the present conditions, there are likely to 
be a number of early bankruptcies in this sector. Table 2. shows the state of farm break-up at 
November 1992 although this is merely a snapshot of a very fluid and uncertain process. 
Table 2. Summary of breakup of State Farms into private businesses as at November 1992 
Aimag Original New Prvte Public Co-op Co-op State Sole 
Farms Farms Cmpy Cmpy Unlim Ltd Farm Trader 
Arbangai 1 3 3 
Bulgan 4 6 6 
Bayan Ulgeii 3 8 2 
Covi Altai 3 3 3 
Dornod 4 49 11 • 15 1 4 1 4 
Zarhan 2 2 2 
Overhangai 1 5 4 1 
Sukhebataar 2 4 1 3 
Selenge 16 99 35 57 1 1 4 
Tuv 13 45 29 12 4 
Uvs 5 12 10 2 
Hovd 2 2 
Hovsgol 2 9 7 2 
Hentii 4 26 9 16 1 
Erdenet 1 8 2 4 1 
Ulaanbaatar 6 25 14 9 2 
Darkhan 2 20 1 17 1 
Other 4 4 4 
Total 75 330 143 138 1 6 S 13 
The nature of privatisation in other sectors is also proving to be difficult for agriculture. The most 
obvious single problem is that the process often leads to the creation of private monopolies and 
monopsonies (with many of the characteristics of their State precursors). These organisations 
invariably continue to behave much as they did before but without the constraints of being part of the 
state system. At present there is no effective anti-monopoly legislation and the effects on smaller 
businesses at local level can be very serious indeed. 
In the context of monopolisation as in that of price control, the work of IRIS5 offers some valuable 
perspectives. The use of an evolutionary approach to understanding reform policy as propounded by 
Murrel et al (1992) yields some useful insights into the agents of change in society. A society's 
inventory of knowledge is the sum total of the personal knowledge of individuals within it. This 
knowledge has been shaped and governed by the institutions and organisations that operate within 
the society. The behaviour of economic actors is determined by the long history of accumulated 
collective experience. As a result there is an implicit knowledge of the expected action and reaction 
whenever economic activity takes place. When radical changes in the economy are made the actors 
no longer have a pool of experience relevant to the new set of conditions upon which to draw. The 
inherent tendency is to revert to that which was known before but modified according to the degree 
of understanding of the new order. Although the rules may change the instinctive behavioural 
patterns of the players remain much the same. For many, especially the unskilled and semi-skilled 
'institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, at the University of Maryland, USA. 
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workers, the reforms are leading to a situation of increasing hardship. There are those who have been 
able to see opportunities for self-advancement under the new regime but this is often by means of 
exploiting deficiencies in the system rather than genuine wealth creating activities. To state that the 
private sector is entirely comprised of short-term opportunistic activities is perhaps unfair and unduly 
pessimistic. 
Murrel and his colleagues conclude that anti-monopoly legislation could be counter-productive 
because of the lack of understanding and experience on the part of those charged with the task of 
enforcing of such a law. This argument is well reasoned but it does not address the very real problem 
faced by farmers when having to deal with monopolies. 
3.6. Infrastructure 
The general state of infrastructure represents a serious problem for the Mongolian economy. The 
country is remote, sparsely populated and has a poorly developed infrastructure. Furthermore, the 
recent external shocks to the economy have lead to serious disinvestment in this already meagre 
resource. Most international freight is carried by rail, on the branch of the Trans-Siberian railway 
which links Russia to China. An estimated 30% of internal freight is also carried by rail with the 
remainder being assigned to trucks. One of the most serious limitations to the development of trade 
with China and the Pacific rim region is the change in rail gauge at the border between China and 
Mongolia. All freight has to be unloaded and reloaded, a process that can take as long as two months 
to complete although the transfer of 'priority goods' takes only two weeks! 
Once goods destined for farm use are in the country they have to be unloaded and transferred to 
trucks for delivery. 70% of all freight in Mongolia is carried by truck often over rough tracks which 
exact punishing wear and tear on the vehicles. The fleet consists of over 25,000, mostly Russian, 
vehicles many of which are small (5 tonne) units and are old and inefficient. More than half the 
trucks are over 10 years old and with the shortages hard currency for replacements, fuel and spare 
parts the transportation sector is becoming increasingly fragile. 
At the present time all farm inputs have to be collected by the farms themselves from the state 
distribution centres effectively transferring to the farms the some of the distribution costs. It also 
means that the farms must maintain fleets of trucks for on and off-farm transport. 
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4. WHEAT PRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW 
4.1. History of Wheat Production 
The growing of wheat in Mongolia on the present scale is a relatively recent phenomenon. Before 
the 'Virgin Lands' programme of the late 1950s and early 1960s the area of wheat was of the order of 
20,000 ha. The area grew rapidly (Fig 1.) during the early '60s and thereafter at a steady rate until 
the late 1980s. This enabled Mongolia 
to become more or less self sufficient in 
wheat production, a position that it has 
enjoyed until the recent break up of the 
CMEA and the withdrawal of Russian 
assistance. The creation of the State 
Farms together with the extension of the 
cropped area was based on the Soviet 
Sovkhozy model in which the means of 
production are wholly state owned. As 
with their Soviet counterparts, the 
Mongolian State farms were 
characterised by substantial investments 
in fixed capital in an attempt to lift land 
and labour productivity. The problem 
of low land productivity was simply 
addressed by bringing more marginal 
land into production. The result of this 
has been to reduce the productivity of 
capital and to create a set of 
environmental problems, the impacts of 
which are now becoming increasingly 
apparent. 
55 81 63 65 67 71 73 75 77 70 61 83 
Year 
- Area U T o t a l Harvest 
Figure 2. Wheat area and total harvest, 1955-91 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
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One important result of this form of 
development has been the creation of 
an agricultural sector heavily dependent 
on imported inputs and technologies. 
The pattern generally followed involved 
the creation of facsimiles of the 
production systems being introduced in 
the Soviet Virgin and Idle Lands 
programme in Western Siberia. In most 
cases Soviet experts were involved in 
the process, often responsible for 
running the farm enterprises on behalf of the Mongolians rather than attempting to develop in-country 
expertise together with ecologically and economically sustainable production systems. 
3 Ammonium Nltrat* Sups*phofphit« Pol an Km Chlerid* 
Figure 1. Fertiliser imports, 1976-92 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
The immediate legacy of this pattern of development, in the aftermath of the sudden and complete 
withdrawal of Soviet support, is a sector of agriculture which is extremely vulnerable to external 
economic forces. There is also a dearth of appropriate management and technical expertise in crop 
farming. 
Evidence from the FSU (Brooks and Johnson, 1983) suggests that total factor productivity in 
mechanised agriculture does not compare well with that of western agriculture. By comparing areas 
in the former USSR with those of similar agro-climatic characteristics in North America, they estimate 
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that productivity in Soviet agriculture is around half that of its American counterpart6. Given the 
similarities these conclusions are assumed to apply to Mongolian agriculture. This represents a 
serious situation given the level of capital investment in the Mongolian agriculture and present need 
to service and renew this capital with hard currency. 
4.2. Geographical Distribution 
The main wheat growing areas are in the central northern part of the country, with the aimags of 
Selenge and Tuv assuming the greatest importance. These areas enjoy higher levels of precipitation 
than would be typical for the country as a whole. The distribution of cereal growing by aimag is 
shown in table 3. 
Table 3. Total cereal harvest by Aimag, 1987-89 
1987 
'000t 
1988 
'000t 
1989 
'000t 
3 yr Av 
'000t 
Dist 
% 
1987 
tha"1 
1988 
tha"1 
1989 
tha"1 
Arhangai 39.7 28.5 46.7 38.3 5.1 1.15 0.82 1.27 
Bayan Ulugei 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.85 0.78 0.89 
Bayanhongor 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.39 0.8 1.00 
Bulgan 72.9 88.2 112.4 91.2 12.1 0.95 1.23 1.56 
Govi Altai 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.1 1.56 1.19 1.33 
Dornogovi 
Dornod 1S.4 45.2 65.6 42.1 5.6 0.42 1.18 1.64 
Dundgovi 
Dzavhan 18.2 11.6 6 11.9 1.6 0.77 0.50 0.28 
Uvurhangai 29.9 15.7 25.2 23.6 3.1 1.56 0.82 1.25 
Omnogovi 
Sukhbaatar 11.6 13.4 17.9 14.3 1.9 0.86 0.98 1.19 
Selenge 211.3 323.4 199.3 244.7 32.6 1.27 1.82 1.10 
Tuv 177.7 139.6 206.9 174.7 23.3 1.33 0.98 1.28 
Uvs 26.7 27.2 36.1 30.0 4.0 0.82 0.84 1.07 
Hovd 3.7 2.1 3.2 3.0 0.4 1.11 0.63 1.03 
Hovsgol 20.1 36.2 35.9 30.7 4.1 0.87 1.62 1.58 
Hentei 34.4 42.2 57.9 44.8 6.0 0.88 1.06 1.35 
Total 663.4 774.7 814.8 751.0 100.0 
Source: Central Statistical Board MPR National Statistics 1989 
4.3. Climate 
Climate is one of the most serious constraints upon crop production in Mongolia. The extreme 
continental climate means a short growing season, typically around 100 days. This usually affords 
only narrow windows of opportunity for many time-critical operations, especially sowing and 
harvest, and so timeliness and efficiency of field operations are of the essence. The fluctuation in 
weather during the growing season can be both severe and unpredictable. In 1992 for example a 
sudden frost (-12 deg Celsius) in June led to a significant loss of yield. Harvesting takes place during 
September when the average daily temperature is down to 8 deg C and snow falls are not unknown. 
One of the effects of frosts during the harvest period is to hasten ripening which may lead to small 
grain size. The highly peaked requirements for field operations in part explains the level of 
investment in machinery. 
The rainfall data in Fig 3., collected at Jargalant State Farm in Tuv Aimag, illustrate both the low 
mean level of precipitation and the degree of year to year variability. Over the period 1976-89 the 
mean rainfall was 261 mm with a standard deviation of 93. The minimum value was 145 mm and 
the maximum 492. Further data are shown in table 6. for each of the agro-climatic zones in which 
wheat is grown. 
6ln the case of Mongolia, the most comparable region on an agro-climatic basis is Montana in the USA. There are slight 
differences in the rainfall regimes and annual temperatures but these are minor. Agro-climatic homologues can be useful in that 
differences in the performance of agricultural systems can certain caveats, be attributed to managerial, technological and 
economic factors rather than the physical environment. 
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Figure 3. Annual precipitation, Jargalant State Farm 
mm deg Celsius 
Precipitation Averafle Temperature 
Because of the peaked distribution of 
rainfall with over half the annual 
amount falling in the summer months 
and very little in the spring, the soil 
moisture at sowing time tends to be 
low. The months of April and May as 
well as being dry are also the amongst 
the most windy with average 
windspeeds of over 2 m sec"1 and 
greater than 10 m sec"1 for more than 
half the month. This can mean 
problems with wind erosion particularly 
on the fallowed land and measures must 
be taken to minimise the soil loss. The 
most common response to this problem 
is to plant the crop in strips about 30 
metres wide with the fallowed land in 
between. This allows the crop to act a 
a wind break preventing wind run over 
large areas of exposed soil thereby 
minimising the amount of soil picked 
up by the wind. The strong, dry winds 
also mean that the potential evapo-
transpiration rate is high at this time. 
This can have the effect of desiccating 
the crop at the time of establishment. 
Heavy frosts during this time can also 
mean the crop would be set back 
leading to reductions in yield. 
Figure 4. Monthly precipitation and temperature, Jargalant State Farm 
4.4. Soils 
Soils in the northern belt of Mongolia are of the Mollisol order. The surface horizon is usually thick 
and dark with a granular, soft structure. This soil type tends to develop under prairie type grassland 
vegetation and hence is also found in the Great Plain states of N. America, parts of S. America as 
well as a large belt of central Asia including Mongolia. 
Mollisols are inherently fertile soils with reasonably high organic matter and are well suited to cereal 
production if managed effectively. When first brought into crop production reasonable yields are 
possible with minimal fertiliser application. Continuous cropping leads to a reduction in soil organic 
matter and values of 3-4% are typical for cropped soils. In general soil fertility is not a constraint to 
crop production, low precipitation and low temperatures being much more significant. It should be 
noted however that these soils are susceptible to wind erosion and measures must be taken to 
minimise soil loss. The relatively poor moisture retention together with the low rainfall means that 
fallowing is a necessary component of crop husbandry. 
In the main crop growing areas the soil types are Brown Chestnut, Dark Brown Chestnut and 
Meadow Brown Chestnut. 
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Table 4. Some technical data on arable soils 
Soil Type Org 
Matt 
% 
Tot 
N2 
% 
Ca 
PPm 
Mg 
ppm 
pH p 2 o 5 
PPm 
K 2 O 
EEHL 
Dark brown chestnut soil 
Slightly loamy 
Middle loamy 
3.9 
4.3 
0.20 
0.28 
20.1 
21.S 
2.1 
8.9 
6.8 
6.9 
2.7 
16.3 
11.0 
5.9 
Brown chestnut soil 
Slightly loamy 
Middle loamy 
2.4 
2.5 
0.20 
0.20 
18.7 
21.0 
8.8 
9.4 
6.8 
6.9 
16.7 
9.2 
16.0 
17.1 
Meadow brown chestnut soil 
Slightly loamy 
Middle loamy 
4.5 
3.5 
0.30 
0.30 
24.0 
23.2 
12.2 
5.4 
6.8 
6.7 
14.5 
5.3 
10.0 
9.7 
Source: UNDP/FAO Agricultural Sector Background paper 
Arable soils in Mongolia are classified into three groups according to suitability for cropping. Soil 
class I is the best, accounting for 35% of the arable area. 31.1% is Class II and 30.4% Class III. The 
designation of suitability is a function of the soil and other factors such as climate and topography. In 
the most important cropping aimags of Selenge and Tuv cereal crops are grown on Class I & II land 
using a crop:crop:fallow rotation whereas on class III land a crop:fallow rotation only is possible. 
The principal reason for the summer or clean fallow period is to allow the build up of moisture in the 
uncropped land. The low precipitation is a serious constraint to crop production and the moisture 
deficit in the early part of the growing season is particularly problematic. Second year wheat in the 
2:1 rotation will yield 30-40% less than first year crop as a result of both lower moisture availability 
and diminished soil fertility. The fallow period also permits weed control by cultivation. 
4.5. Regional Production Data 
In this section the agro-climatic zones are referred using the numbering system found in the 
MoA/FAO Agricultural Sector Background paper. Brief summaries of the zones in which wheat 
production occurs are found in table 5 with climatic data in table 6 . Production data are available 
in the MoA, Ulaan Baatar on an aimag basis. Summary data abstracted from these records are 
presented below. Selenge and Tuv were chosen because of their pre-eminence as areas of crop 
farming, the others as examples of the broad zonal categories used in the country. 
Table 5. Description of agro-dimatic zones 
Zone Description 
3 The Khuvsgul mountain, taiga, forest and steppe regions. Major activities are production of yaks, cattle and reindeer. 
4 Western Hangai steppe and arid steppe areas. Sheep, early-ripening cereals and fodder production are the most suitable 
agricultural activities. 
5 Southern Hangai steppe and arid-steppe and semi-desert areas are suitable for sheep and cattle activities, early-ripening 
grain and fodder crops. 
6 Selenge forest and steppe sub-region is suitable for cattle and sheep activities and rainfed crop production. The Selenge 
valley if the largest crop area in the country. 
7 Onon low mountains arid steppe sub-region is suitable for rainfed crop production and cattle and sheep activities. 
8 Hentii mountain forest and steppe sub-region is suitable for cattle production and rainfed cropping. 
9 Ulz-Tuul steppe and arid steppe sub-regions are suitable for sheep, cattle, early-ripening grain and fodder production. 
13 Southern part of Central Halha is suitable for sheep, goat and cattle production. 
14 Kherlen-Khukh-Nuur in the north is suitable for sheep and cattle production. Rainfed crops can be produced in good 
years. 
15 Menen-Dari'ganga arid steppe region is suitable for sheep and goat raising and rainfed cereal and fodder crop 
production. 
Source: UNDP/FAO Agricultural Sector Background paper 
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Table 6. Climatic information for agro-climatic zones 
Zone Av Elev Mean Temp Temp Heat Sum Growing Frost Precip Snow Wind 
'000 Annual Jan Jul >10degC Season free tation Cover Speed 
masl degC degC degC days days mm mm m/sec 
4 2.0:2.5 0.0:2.5 -16:-20 15:19 1400:2000 80:100 80:100 200:250 >15 2:4 
6 1.5:2.0 2.5:5.0 -20:-24 15:19 1000:2000 80:100 100:120 300:400 S:10 4:6 
7 1.S:2.2 0.0:2.5 -16:-19 15:19 1400:2000 70: 90 80:100 250:400 5:10 4:6 
8 1.5:2.2 2.5:5.0 -20:-24 13:15 1000:2000 70: 90 100:120 300:400 5:10 4:6 
9 1.5:2.0 2.5:5.0 -20:-24 13:15 1000:2000 80:100 100:120 300:400 5:10 4:6 
14 0.5:1.1 0.0:2.5 -20:-24 19:22 2000:2600 90:110 120:140 150:250 5:10 4:6 
15 0.9:2.0 0.0:2.5 -20:-24 19:22 2000:2600 >130 120:140 150:250 >S 6:8 
Source: UNDP/FAO Agricultural Sector Background paper 
The tables (7 to 12) below show the areas and yields of wheat in selected aimags based on MoA 
records over a seven year period. Unfortunately changes in the institutional structures in recent years 
have meant that the equivalent data from 1990 and onwards were not readily available. The tables 
do however illustrate the relative importance of the wheat in each aimag and also the level of yields 
attained. Of course there is considerable within-aimag variability which is lost when presenting 
these aggregate data. The tables are useful in showing something of the performance within the 
various agro-climatic zones. 
Selenge Zones 6 & 7 
Selenge in the central, northern part of Mongolia, is the single most important aimag for wheat, 
accounting for around 40% of all production. Zones 6 and 7 are amongst the most favourable for 
growing wheat, enjoying reasonable rainfall (300-400mm) and growing seasons of 100 days or more. 
The mean yield over the years 1983 to 1989 is 1.18 t ha"1. Rotations of 2:1 wheat:fallow are typical 
as illustrated by the mean value of 1.74 ha wheat to 1 ha fallow7. 
The aimag is also reasonably close the main centres of population and therefore enjoys (together with 
Tuv) lower transport costs for both inputs and outputs. 
Table 7. Wheat production data for Selenge aimag, 1983-89 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Average C.V. 
Area sown (ha) 159882 161889 169485 255179 146054 155968 170759 174174 0.19 
Area harvested (ha) 155589 135877 163465 255079 127128 151014 132836 160141 0.25 
% of sown area harvested 97 84 96 100 87 97 78 91 0.09 
Yield (area sown) (t ha"1) 1.45 0.99 1.45 0.82 1.13 1.69 0.75 1.18 0.28 
Yield (area harvested) (t ha'1) 1.49 1.18 1.5 0.82 1.3 1.75 0.96 1.29 0.23 
Total production (t) 231828 160335 245198 209165 165266 264275 127523 200513 0.23 
Area fallow (ha) 92775 98814 97063 101164 110852 102765 101529 100709 0.05 
Ratio cropped:fallow (:1) 1.72 1.64 1.75 2.52 1.32 1.S2 1.68 1.74 0.20 
Tuv Zones 7/8/9 
Tuv Aimag also includes some of the best wheat growing land in the country and, together with 
Selenge is relatively close to the main population centres. This has the advantage of lower transport 
costs. Yields are relatively high with a mean of 1.33 t ha"1 over the 1983-89 period. The mean yield 
level is slightly higher than Tuv at 1.33 t ha"1, however the area fallowed is much higher with a crop 
to fallow ratio of 0.92. 
7These figures were compiled from MoA records held in Ulaan Baatar. In the time available it was not possible to put together 
detailed crop rotations. Of course wheat is often grown in rotation with other crops such as other cereals, potatoes and forage 
crops and so the ratio can be an approximation only. However, given that wheat is the most important crop they provide a useful 
indication of the fallowing requirement. 
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Table 8. Wheat production data for Tuv aimag, 1983-89 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Average C.V. 
Area sown (ha) 70S49 60623 66456 68702 64437 69297 92905 70424 0.14 
Area harvested (ha) 67332 59607 62035 68702 63484 68247 92160 68795 0.1 S 
% of sown area harvested 95 98 93 100 99 98 99 98 0.02 
Yield (area sown) (t ha'1) 1.44 1.23 1.46 1.44 1.43 0.99 1.31 1.33 0.12 
Yield (area harvested) (t ha"1) 1.51 1.25 1.56 1.44 1.45 1.01 1.32 1.36 0.13 
Total production (t) 101671 74509 96775 98931 92052 68929 121651 93503 0.17 
Area fallow (ha) 80117 78728 73504 69737 85785 81114 72329 77331 0.07 
Ratio cropped:fallow (:1) 0.88 0.77 0.90 0.99 0.75 0.85 1.28 0.92 0.18 
Bulgan Zone 6 
Bulgan enjoys similar climatic conditions to those of Selenge (zone 6) although much less land is 
available for cropping. Official estimates suggest that 4% of the country's arable land is found in 
Bulgan with 16% in Selenge 
Table 9. Wheat production data for Bulgan aimag, 1983-89 
1983 1984 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989 Average C.V. 
Area sown (ha) 23596 23316 23257 31282 12630 11920 13001 19857 0.35 
Area harvested (ha) 23596 16956 23257 30914 12038 11920 11771 18636 0.37 
% of sown area harvested 100 73 100 99 95 100 91 94 0.10 
Yield (area sown) (t ha"1) 1.39 0.83 1.23 1.31 1.05 1.55 1.56 1.28 0.19 
Yield (area harvested) (t ha'1) 1.39 1.14 1.25 1.33 1.1 1.55 1.72 1.35 0.15 
Total production (t) 32798 19330 29071 41116 13242 18476 20246 24897 0.36 
Area fallow (ha) 15670 17482 16600 15400 14118 14937 14335 15506 0.07 
Ratio cropped-.fallow (:1) 1.51 1.33 1.40 2.03 0.89 0.80 0.91 1.27 0.32 
Uvs (Baruun turuun) Zone 4 
Uvs is in the North West of the country, lying to the north of the Altai mountains and is not a major 
wheat growing area. As is the case with many outlying regions, the primary purpose for growing 
wheat is for local consumption. 
Table 10. Wheat production data for Uvs aimag, 1983-89 
1983 1984 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989 Average C.V. 
Area sown (ha) 21766 27611 24170 27232 27375 28484 26106 0.09 
Area harvested (ha) 21146 19724 23073 27232 26895 27395 24244 0.13 
% of sown area harvested 97, 71 95 100 98 96 93 0.11 
Yield (area sown) (t ha"1) 1.53 0.51 1.19 0.70 0.76 0.98 0.95 0.36 
Yield (area harvested) (t ha"1) 1.58 0.72 1.2S 0.70 0.77 1.02 1.01 0.32 
Total production (t) 33411 14201 28841 19062 20709 27943 20595 0.50 
Area fallow (ha) 15193 14300 15400 15563 15807 15253 0.03 
Ratio cropped:fal!ow (:1) 1.43 1.93 1.57 1.76 1.80 1.70 0.10 
Data for 1986 were unavailable 
Hentii Zone 8 
Hentii lies to the east of the main cropping areas of Tuv and Selenge and enjoys reasonable rainfall 
but short growing seasons (70 to 90 days). 
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Table 11. Wheat production data for Hentii aimag, 1983-89 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Average C.V. 
Area sown (ha) 22350 21546 25380 29127 26993 26899 27433 25675 0.10 
Area harvested (ha) 17996 21494 25380 26191 25632 24352 27433 24068 0.13 
% of sown area harvested 81 100 100 90 95 91 100 94 0.07 
Yield (area sown) (t ha"1) 0.S4 1.25 1.30 0.87 0.84 0.83 1.20 0.98 0.27 
Yield (area harvested) (t ha'1) 0.67 1.25 1.3 0.97 0.88 0.92 1.2 1.03 0.21 
Total production (t) 12057 26868 32994 25405 22556 22404 32920 25029 0.27 
Area fallow (ha) 23500 25336 27904 28234 27727 26033 25588 26332 0.06 
Ratio croppedifaliow (:1) 0.9S 0.85 0.91 1.03 0.97 1.03 1.07 0.97 0.07 
Dornod Zones 14 & 15 (some 9) 
Dornod, a large aimag in the extreme east of Mongolia, tends to be a drier region with precipitation 
often well below 250 mm per annum. Although 22 per cent of Mongolia's arable land is found in 
Dornod, it provides less than 6% of the total cereal harvest because of this severe climatic constraint. 
A single wheat crop followed by a fallow tend to be the dominant rotation (the crop/fallow ratio is 
0.86). The coefficient of variation for yield is 0.51 suggesting that year to year variability is greater 
than in other regions. The mean area of unharvested crop is 15% of the sown area a figure which is 
heavily influenced by the major losses in 1987 and (less so) in 1983. The variability of yield rate 
together with risk of significant areas of unharvested crop combine to give a C.V. for total production 
of 0.68. Thus Dornod can be considered a particularly marginal area for cereal cropping. 
Table 1%. Wheat production data for Dornod aimag, 1983-89 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Average C.V. 
Area sown (ha) 17820 10672 12820 14328 21927 18968 23758 17185 0.26 
Area harvested (ha) 12329 10119 12820 13357 8254 18968 23026 14125 0.34 
% of sown area harvested 69 95 100 93 38 100 97 85 0.25 
Yield (area sown) (t ha"1) 0.48 1.25 0.84 0.46 0.27 1.04 1.52 0.84 0.51 
Yield (area harvested) (t ha"1) 0.69 1.32 0.84 0.49 0.72 1.04 1.57 0.95 0.37 
Total production (t) 8507 13357 10769 6S4S 5943 19727 36151 14428 0.68 
Area fallow (ha) 14409 12195 16170 26518 21864 25895 27183 20605 0.28 
Ratio cropped.-fallow (:1) 1.24 0.88 0.79 0.54 1.00 0.73 0.87 0.86 0.23 
4.6. Cultivars 
Three cultivar types, all originating from the former USSR, are grown in Mongolia, these being: 
• Skala & Albitum 43 early ripening (83 days) 
• Orhon & Saratovskaja 29 medium ripening (92 days) 
• Buryatskaja 34 late ripening (>92 days) 
Later ripening varieties would provide higher yields but can be grown only in those areas in which 
the growing season is long enough. Most seed is farm saved rather than bought in. The common 
practice is to buy in a relatively small amount of good quality seed and use the crop from this as 
entirely as seed. This would provide a "bulking up" ratio of about six to one. The resulting grain is 
termed "first class" seed. The process is repeated for two further years yielding "second" and "third 
class" seed after which it is abandoned. This practice is likely to lead to a loss in performance through 
loss of seed vigour, build up of seed-borne diseases and contamination with other seeds. MoA 
agronomists suggested that field germination rates are around 60-65 percent. 
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Sowing rates are typically 180 to 200 kgs per ha. This is very high in relation to the yield obtained 
and does not compare well with Montana where for similar spring wheat yields a rate of 50 kg per ha 
would be more typical. The need to set aside around 15-20% of the crop for the following year's 
seed is costly, not only in terms of the lost revenue but also because of the need to provide extra 
storage facilities. There is an urgent need for research into many agronomic aspects of wheat 
production and seed technology is but one. Improving seed viability and reducing the required seed 
rate would be very beneficial. 
Winter wheat varieties with sufficient hardiness are not available as yet and so this means of 
improving yields is not an option. The very low winter temperatures together with the risk of 
insufficient snow cover for the crop during this period suggest that the use of autumn sown crops is 
less likely than has been the case in other parts of the world with similar climatic conditions. 
4.7. Fertiliser Usage 
The recommended application of fertiliser is: 
• Nitrogen 60 kg ha"1 
• Phosphorus 60 kg ha"1 
• Potassium 40 kg ha"1 
usually as urea or ammonium nitrate 
single or triple super-phosphate 
potassium chloride 
These recommendations are apparently based on trials to establish the response of the crop to 
fertiliser use carried out in the 1970s. The rates are in fact designed to give maximum rather than 
optimal output. In practice the restrictions on availability of fertiliser meant that actual rates were 
often much lower. On farms with intensive livestock the farmyard manure is also used as a 
supplementary fertiliser. 
Fertiliser use more than doubled between 1978 and 1988 but has declined sharply in both 1991 and 
1992. Though it was not possible to obtain data for 1991 it appears that the amounts imported in 
1992 were around 15% of the 1990 level; a problem brought about as a result of the shortage of 
foreign exchange. 
4.8. Agrochemicals 
The use of sprays and other chemical treatments tends to be low, mainly because of difficulties in 
securing supplies. The most important operation is the application of a herbicide (2,4-D) for the 
control of broad-leaved weeds. Additionally seed is treated for the control of seed-borne diseases by 
using an organo-mercuric (or zinc) dressing. 
Improving the effectiveness of spraying is one means by which substantial productivity gains could be 
made. Anecdotal evidence suggests that weed control is often neglected or poorly done. Calibration 
and operation of spraying equipment as well as timing of application are all critical in effective weed 
control. However, on many farms the job is not done at all because either the machinery is non-
operational or the materials cannot be obtained. Weed infestation will certainly reduce yield as the 
weeds compete for soil moisture and nutrients and the problems will be carried forward into 
subsequent years. 
Spraying at the wrong time can also lead to loss of yield. The Montana Extension service estimate 
that by delaying the application of 2,4-D until after jointing can damage the crop, resulting in a yield 
loss of up to 4.5 centners per ha. Losses will also arise from the incorrect application rate and 
incomplete or patchy coverage. 
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4.9. Harvest 
The harvest operation is one the most important in determining the overall efficiency of production. 
Sloane et al (1992, p48) describe the operational procedures as organised by the State Harvesting 
Commission. This was a truly national effort being co-ordinated centrally in Ulaan Baatar. 
Agronomists from each farm would indicate likely harvest dates and requirements for transportation 
services. Trucks would then be re-assigned from other duties to help with the harvest. Military 
conscripts and students would be posted to the farms to provide unskilled labour. In total some 4600 
trucks and 2600 trailers are involved in the harvest operation. These trucks are predominantly five 
tonne units and, even with trailers, the capacity is quite low. The whole transport operation tends to 
be inefficient and the problems referred to elsewhere in this report are felt particularly at this peak 
time. 
The usual harvesting technique is to mow and wilt the crop for three to five days before threshing. 
This is important when the risk from frost damage or head loss and shatter is high. The crop would 
normally be cut at around 35 to 40% moisture and allowed to desiccate naturally. The wilted crop is 
then headed with combines fitted with pick-up headers and the grain carted by truck to the grain 
dressing centres, usually at or near the State Farm complex. The combination of poor combines and 
fairly green (and often contaminated) crops means that the sample needs to be dressed a second time 
using static dressing machines operated by casual labour. This process is recognised as a serious 
bottleneck in the process and another source of inefficiency in the process. Sometimes direct-cut 
combining is possible but this is the exception rather than the norm. 
Harvest losses are thoughtto be high and are covered in more detail in the section on losses. 
4.10. Input Supply 
The supply of all inputs to agriculture has been under the sole control of the Ministry of Agriculture 
until very recently. Allocation of inputs was dependant on the production targets set for each farm 
and would be handled centrally. Because so many of the inputs were imported there were obvious 
foreign trade implications which influenced the trading agreements within the CMEA. Most of the 
items in table 13. for example would need to be imported. During the 1980's there was substantial 
investment in the capacity of the State farm sector as illustrated by the rise in fertiliser imports during 
this period (see figure 2.). 
At the present time the supply of imported inputs remains largely centralised through the actions of a 
parastatal, the Agricultural Supply Service (ASS), although there is a growing number of private 
concerns involved in the supply of agricultural inputs. Not unnaturally the present modus operandi 
of the ASS owes much to its role under the Ministry of Agriculture. One of the problems of the ASS is 
that it enjoys a monopolistic position which presents potential problems for farmers although there 
have been considerations on splitting it into a number of competing parts (Sloane et al, 1991). 
However, the structure and remoteness of farms in Mongolia make it unlikely that competing 
businesses supplying the agricultural sector will emerge at least in the short term. This problem is 
brought into focus when conflicts of objectives find their realisation in policies that disadvantage 
farmers and create a new set of distorting conditions. An example of this type of problem can be 
found in the case of a shipment of 10,000 tonnes of nitrogen fertiliser that was arranged through a 
Japanese trading company. Apparently the MoA and ASS were fully involved in the price 
negotiations but nevertheless agreed to a price of $196 per tonne cif Ulaan Baatar. (It was not clear 
whether the fertiliser was urea or ammonium nitrate but the price is substantially higher than 
prevailing world prices for both these products.) The MoA proceeded to charge farmers a price of Tg 
11,800 per tonne, made up of the basic cost of $196 plus 15% import duty, 10% surcharge and a 
25% handling charge, the resulting figure being converted to domestic prices at the official rate of 40 
Tg to $1. Although the overvalued exchange rate provided an implicit subsidy, the effect of the other 
charges together with the low price expectation for the product, meant that purchasing fertiliser at 
this price was uneconomic in that the marginal value product would be lower than the marginal cost 
at any rate of application. As a result only 3,000 tonnes were sold, the remainder being left in 
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Ministry stores8. In short there has been an attempt to extract benefits from the supplier's 
monopolistic advantage although this is most likely a result of the a failure to understand the impact 
of these pricing decisions. 
Table 13. Average use of fuel and fertilisers in agriculture, 1987-89 
Item State Co-ops Total Total 
Farms Quantity Value 
tonnes tonnes tonnes Tg '000 
Fuel 
Diesel 44980 49460 94440 128439 
Petrol 1873S 46701 65436 98154 
Oils 2900 3384 6284 28558 
Lubricants S7 28 85 325 
Total 66672 99573 166245 255476 
Fertiliser 
Nitrogen 26049 5256 31305 15026 
Phosphorus 16401 3150 19551 12806 
Potash 2953 390 3343 1170 
Source: Shane etal (1991), Agricultural Sector Background Paper 
At the time of writing the Agricultural Supply Service, a department of the Ministry was still heavily 
involved in the procurement of farm equipment and inputs. According to their records no new 
machinery was imported (and distributed by the ASS) during 1991 and only $1,500,000 worth during 
1992. Interestingly, a significant proportion of this came from China. For a more detailed study of 
the input supply to agriculture see Sloane et al (1991) p 40. 
As new farming businesses are established and the number of agents increases so inter-farm 
transactions as well as those between farms and non-farming interests take on increasing importance. 
To cater for this a commodity exchange has been setup to provide the infrastructure to host these 
market activities. The exchange has branches in all 18 aimags and in 9 urban centres comprising 330 
in total. The organisation was established in 1991 with the rules for trading widely publicised in 
newspapers. It now estimates that it now handles 60-70% of all agricultural transactions. The need 
for an organisation such as this is manifest when it is realised that such a function was largely 
redundant under the former system of central planning and state orders. Without the means for 
allowing the forces of supply and demand to be resolved, the viability of an agricultural sector 
operating on market based principles would be low. Operating costs of the exchange are met by 
commission charges of between 0.2 and 1% of the value of the transaction. Selected prices are 
published in newspapers on a regular basis. One of the important side effects of the Agricultural 
Commodity Exchange is the collection of valuable price data. This should be of particular value to 
policy analysts although as yet there is no established system for the capture (as a time-series 
database) and analysis of these data within the MoA. 
4.11. Processing and Marketing 
Perhaps more than any other aspect of the wheat sector, the processing and distribution of grain 
displays centralist organisation and management. The losses and inefficiencies at this stage are also 
substantial. Although there is a very close linkage between the production of grain on the farms and 
the processing into flour and other products in the flour and feed mills, the latter is not studied in 
detail. There are serious logistical and organisational problems that are likely to result in this area 
with the move away from central planning. 
It is worth considering the nature of imports that would result from a reduction in the area of home 
grown wheat. The approach adopted in this study is assumes that imported whole grain wheat would 
substitute for domestically produced wheat and that this would then be processed in Mongolia. For 
completeness, a thorough study of the efficiency of the processing sector would need to be 
^Although it is not possible to provide a documented account of this particular case, the story was authenticated by at least two 
persons with whom the author discussed the matter. 
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undertaken to determine the degree to which failings at this stage impact upon the overall commodity 
system. There appear to be considerable inefficiencies in the processing and storage of grain. In 
common with other sectors of the economy, this area is suffering from a shortage of capital for re-
investment. In the time available it was not possible to include this aspect and so it remains an issue 
for further investigation. It has another impact on the study in that there has been a recent move 
towards on-farm processing of wheat rather than selling to the millers who represent a monopsony. 
There is a perception on the part of producers of the benefits of adding value on the farm and then 
selling directly to urban wholesalers, retailers or even consumers. If the incentives are sufficiently 
strong enough then this should also be a stimulus for improved efficiency at the processing stage 
which should benefit the sector as a whole. At the present time the degree to which this has 
occurred is difficult to determine but it is probably quite small. The main constraint is the shortage of 
the foreign exchange needed to purchase the small Chinese flour mills that seem to be preferred. 
The existing processing capacity is found in ten flour and animal feed combinants located in the main 
wheat producing areas. Table 14. shows the nominal processing and storage capacity of each mill 
together with the recorded deliveries between 1986 and 1990. (Note that this is total grain not just 
wheat.) The siting of the mills has been made on the basis of serving the local grain production in an 
attempt to minimise the requirement for expensive transportation (see the map 1.). Even so, the mills 
estimate that, under the former price regime, transport costs accounted for over 8 per cent of their 
total costs. The practice of the mills covering the costs of transport of grain from the dressing centres 
to the mill offered to the farms a form of pan-territorial price uniformity. The future of this following 
privatisation is unclear. If the transport element were to be separated and run as an independent 
business then the incentive to fully recover costs would be more apparent. Assuming that the millers 
retain a significant degree of monopsony power we may reasonably conclude that these costs would 
be passed on to the growers, lowering the farm gate price, especially for farms remote from 
processing sites and centres of consumption. 
Table 14. Supply of grain to flour and feed milling combinants 
Combinant Prod Store 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Five 
Cap Cap Yr Av 
'0001 '0001 '000 t '0001 '0001 '0001 '0001 '0001 
Ulaanbaatar 42.0 64.0 110.8 72.9 47.5 115.1 67.4 82.7 
Sukhbaatar 41.0 82.0 74.4 57.3 109.4 58.4 50.4 70.0 
Kharkhorin 16.0 12.0 28.7 29.2 23.0 35.8 32.6 29.9 
Bulgan 11.5 38.7 26.6 24.2 27.0 28.1 25.5 26.3 
Ulaangom 9.0 4.0 20.3 11.5 14.5 17.5 8.1 14.4 
Dornod 9.0 7.0 6.8 3.0 19.5 38.9 14.4 16.5 
Moron 9.0 6.5 26.5 8.5 15.5 14.8 18.2 16.7 
Ondorkhaan 9.0 4.0 23.2 17.2 21.6 24.2 22.8 21.8 
Darhan 54.0 82.0 135.2 86.0 153.4 79.1 62.8 103.3 
Barunhaara 12.0 28.5 16.7 11.4 14.8 10.3 16.3 
Total 200.5 312.2 481.0 326.5 442.8 426.7 312.5 397.9 
Source: Corporation of Flour and Feed Milling Enterprises 
Table 15. below shows deliveries of wheat to each of the 10 main milling combinants over the period 
1980-90 . It is worth noting that nearly 37% of the grain is considered unsuitable for milling and is 
therefore used for animal feed. This represents a serious efficiency loss in the system in so much that 
the land would be better used for growing specific animal feed crops rather than relying on what is 
effectively a by-product. 
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Figure 5. Total wheat deliveries to mills, 1980-90 
Table 15. Wheat supplied to flour combinants - unweighted averages 1980-90 
Combinant Class 
I 
Quantity ('000 tonnes) 
Class Sub 
II Standard 
Total Moisture 
% 
1 litre 
weight 
Gluten 
% 
Rubble 
% 
Screenings 
Ulaanbaatar 0.1 33.9 16.6 50.5 16.9 73 S 22.0 2.3 11.9 
Sukhbaatar 0.8 33.8 16.8 51.4 18.2 728 20.9 3.6 7.6 
KharKhorin 0.0 9.2 11.3 20.4 18.2 727 21.6 3.8 16.S 
Bulgan 0.3 11.1 4.4 15.8 16.8 733 20.2 3.2 10.1 
Ulaan Gom 1.0 7.8 4.6 13.4 16.9 738 25.7 4.0 6.4 
Dornod 0.0 4.6 4.6 9.2 17.2 736 23.1 4.4 10.1 
Moron 0.7 6.3 3.9 10.9 17.8 728 21.3 2.7 8.5 
Ondorkhaan 0.0 6.2 6.5 12.6 18.3 742 22.8 4.1 10.8 
Darban 0.4 38.6 28.0 67.1 17.6 721 21.1 S.4 10.3 
Barunhaara 0.0 6.9 2.9 9.8 15.0 646 18.1 2.8 8.1 
Total/Average 3.3 158.2 99.6 261.1 17.3 723 21.7 3.6 10.0 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
Table 16. shows the typical pattern of grain utilisation over the period between 1985 and 1991. The 
figures were not complete for 1991 hence the somewhat large discrepancy arising from unallocated 
usage. 
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Table 16. Distribution of wheat harvest, 1985-91 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Average C V 
Net harvest 632900 607000 482600 616000 615300 526000 466932 563819 0.11 
Seed 90200 95100 84200 98900 104400 95800 96500 93014 0.06 
Consumed on farm 30700 32900 40200 40600 37700 58100 37500 39671 0.21 
Sale to state 511900 469700 358200 476500 473200 372100 332932 427790 0.15 
of which: 
to flour factory 410900 409800 254300 340300 350800 262100 289600 331114 0.18 
to fodder factory 61200 36200 74400 97800 83200 75900 8400 62443 0.45 
seed 20400 13700 2500 13500 13300 3800 11233 0.55 
food factory 10200 7300 6300 9100 10200 9800 8817 0.17 
Pig farm 2200 1200 2700 3100 1300 3000 2250 0.34 
Poultry farm 4400 1500 3400 4600 6600 7000 4383 0.41 
Plant protection 2600 800 2500 1300 1800 0.43 
Bio-combinant 10 100 200 900 100 262 1.24 
Other farms 2500 3200 2400 2700 0.13 
Other fodder 9300 10700 2900 3400 8000 21000 9217 0.65 
Total 511900 479010 355200 476500 474400 372100 319000 426873 0.16 
Discrepancy 0 -9310 3000 0 -1200 0 13932 917 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
Table 17. Wheat deliveries to flour and feed combinants 1985-90 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Class I 7200 4300 1000 13600 1800 1300 
Class II 162300 282000 102200 2S7400 198400 120300 
Sub-std 160300 102300 141700 57200 148S00 75600 
Total 329800 388600 244900 328200 348700 197200 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
Tables 16. and 17. reveal a number of anomalies in the data relating to the processing and 
distribution of grain. Table 16. is based on data supplied by the AERI within the MoA (and reported 
in the UNDP Agricultural Sector Background paper) whereas table 17. is based on records returned 
from the ten milling combinants. The differences are shown graphically in fig 6. The reason for this 
discrepancy is unclear although it does serve to underline the some of the difficulties in using 
secondary data sources. 1985 and 90 stand out as years in which there is a substantial difference 
(e.g. in 1985 the amount delivered to the flour factory is 410,900 in table 16. but only 329,800 in 
table 17.) 
'000 tonnes 
450 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1 ] Data from Min of Agriculture | Data from combinants 
Figure 6. Discrepancy between wheat delivery data from different sources 
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Table 18. Wheat deliveries to mills by grain quality class, 1980-90 ('000 tonnes) 
Amounts adjusted to moisture content of 14% 
Combinant Class 
I 
Class 
II 
Sub 
Standard 
Total 
Ulaanbaatar 0.1 44,5 17.9 62.5 
Sukhbaatar 1.1 41.6 18.4 61.1 
KharKhorin 0.0 10.6 10.9 21.5 
Bulgan 0.0 9.0 6.8 15.8 
Ulaan Gom 1.4 8.5 4.9 14.9 
Dornod 0.0 4.5 5.6 10.1 
Moron 1.0 4.9 3.8 9.8 
Ondorkhaan 0.0 8.3 7.9 16.1 
Darhan 0.6 48.9 33.8 83.3 
Barunhaara 0.0 8.6 3.0 11.6 
Total 4.3 189.4 113.0 306.7 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
The amounts of wheat processed at the ten mills is shown in table 18. These quantities have been 
converted to 14% moisture content so that they are comparable with internationally traded wheat. 
The inadequacy of storage facilities within the ten main flour and feed mills is also a cause of some 
concern as it results in wastage and loss of quality. Further analysis of the processing and marketing 
component of the wheat system is not covered in this study, although they are obvious candidates for 
a rigorous investigation. The nature of state farms is such local processing could fit in well if capital 
for investment can be obtained. It would provide employment during the winter months and reduce 
losses during transport. 
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5. AGROCLIMATIC POTENTIAL FOR WHEAT PRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the reasons why productivity in wheat production is low and offers some 
suggestions as to how this situation may be addressed. As with other aspects of this study, these 
suggestions are based on interviews with experts and secondary data sources. This chapter also 
draws heavily upon the findings of the ADB team planning the Livestock Feeds Improvement Project 
(TAMON 1646) 
iSa^l d 
Losses of grain between the time immediately prior to harvest and the milling process represent one 
of the most important causes of poor factor productivity. Figure 7. shows these losses in a 
diagrammatic form. Sloane et al (1991) estimate on-farm losses to be in the region of 8 to 11 per 
cent. Agronomists at the Crop Research Institute, Darhan suggested that the figure could be as high 
as 20% or even 25 %. Taking 20% as the loss rate, a crop yielding 1 tonne per hectare would offer 
the potential of 1.25 tonnes if these losses could be eliminated. This level of yield would be 
consistent with the biological potential under conditions in the Tuv/Selenge region. The specific 
causes of losses include: 
• Poor control of grazing animals near to growing crops. The idea of enclosing land by fences is 
rather alien in Mongolia and the lack of specific responsibility for crop damage has led to a 
somewhat lax approach to this problem. 
• The poor quality of machinery has been mentioned in other contexts but the costs of breakdowns 
and inefficiency during harvest can be especially severe. A number of sources suggested that the 
NIVA combines do not perform well. They can be difficult to set up correctly and, because of 
poor engineering, tend to lose optimum adjustments very quickly. The losses of grain because of 
incomplete separation become worse when operated on slopes. These problems tend to become 
more pronounced as the machines age, particularly if they are not properly maintained. As a 
result the grain sample tends to be badly cleaned and unacceptable losses through grain being 
shed on the ground can occur. Inadequate operator training and indifference resulting from a 
lack of incentives only serve to exacerbate the problem. 
• Given the climatic conditions in Mongolia the "weather windows" for operations such as harvest 
can be very narrow indeed. It is therefore essential that the equipment be both effective and 
serviceable. The combination of inadequate machinery capacity and poor harvesting conditions 
can lead to serious crop losses. The work rate for combines (windrowing and threshing) is 
around 1 hectare per hour. This figure, based on the MoA norms, corresponds to about 1 hour 
for every tonne harvested; a rather poor rate of operation9. Given that the work rate in practice is 
likely to be significantly lower the degree of weather related losses is not surprising. The season 
change is very quick in Mongolia and snow fall in September is not unusual. As daily 
temperatures drop and overnight frosts become more common, so the probability of crop loss and 
impaired quality of harvested grain increases. One of the reactions to this problem is to suggest 
that the number of combines is insufficient. In fact there are about 4 combines per 1000 hectares 
of grain crop and this should ordinarily be ample although the NIVA combines do tend to be 
smaller than those used in similar conditions in North America. The excessively peaked 
machinery demand is a common problem associated with monocultures and it only serves to 
underline the case for reducing some of the losses and reducing the area of wheat. 
• The weather conditions may actually cause losses in some cases. Hail storms, for example, can 
have a disastrous effect. If the harvest is not completed by the onset of regular frosts and snow 
fall then the crop may need to be abandoned all together. 
9 A combine harvester with a 1.05 m drum and a cutter bar of 3m would be able to harvest about 1 ha per hour in UK conditions 
(direct cutting rather than swathing and picking up later). UK crops would be much heavier (say 5 to 8 tonnes per ha) and so the 
effective work rate in terms of grain harvested per hour for similarly specified combines is much poorer in Mongolia. 
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• Losses also occur during the transportation of grain. Moving grain long distances over rough 
tracks in leaking trucks may account for further losses. 
• Damage to grain during dressing accounts for about 5% of the grain that has been delivered to 
the cleaning site. The combination of poor combines and damp straw at harvest time can lead to 
contaminated grain samples. To deal with this the grain is cleaned using electric dressers in the 
open air. Losses arise because of inadequate handling facilities and poor quality casual labour. 
The lack of concrete floors mean that grain is contaminated and lost whilst loading trucks etc. It 
has been suggested that the casual workers, often unskilled conscripts or students who have been 
assigned to this work rather than volunteering, show little enthusiasm for the work and 
consequently tend to be rather lacking in diligence. The dressing machines also tend to be slow 
and subject to frequent breakdowns. 
• Inadequate storage facilities and practices both on farms and at the combinants account for 
further losses. The mean moisture content for grain delivered to the mills is about 18%. This is 
too high for safe storage unless the temperatures are consistently very low. For much of the 
winter this is indeed the case however there is risk of mycotoxin infection before the temperature 
falls and this can lead to rejection of the grain for human consumption and a significant 
reduction in animal feed value. It must be assumed that the grain retained for seed and other on-
farm use is also at risk to moisture related problems. Another problem often occurring on the 
farms is that animals can sometimes gain access to the grain. As well as the losses due to 
animals eating the grain they also damage and contaminate it. This could be simply remedied by 
the introduction of animal-proof storage facilities. 
• Some of the apparent losses may result from unrecorded consumption on the farm. The rearing 
of livestock by workers is not unusual and it was common practice to make use of grain in store 
for animal feed. 
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5.2. Opportunities for Improving Performance 
One of the most intriguing aspects of this analysis is the extent to which productivity gains in 
mechanised crop production are attainable. Comparative studies on Soviet agriculture and 
observation of the production systems in Mongolia confirm that total factor productivity in this sector 
is poor. It is the expectation of government that the move towards a market economy will create an 
environment that will better stimulate improvements in productivity. The problem of poor incentives 
appears to be well recognised. On this basis, it is therefore helpful to consider the degree to which 
this has occurred so far and will do so in the future. 
It has been suggested elsewhere (Ash et al, 1991) that the centrally planned agricultural sector cannot 
be readily separated from those sectors which supply it and it in turn supplies. The failings of one 
sector often create a knock-on cost in other sectors, for example, frequent and prolonged power cuts 
will reduce output and therefore productivity in industries that require electricity. The failings of one 
sector therefore impact as a negative externality in other, related sectors. In formerly centrally 
planned economies this effect is particularly pronounced as the many goods and services are supplied 
by state (or former state) monopolies offering the farmers little choice. 
It is axiomatic then that producers will have little incentive to improve efficiency if they see no 
means of benefiting from their efforts. If they see that, despite their best efforts in trying to farm, the 
quality of service provided by suppliers is erratic and uncertain, the quality of goods provided is 
shoddy and then the only outlet for their produce is to sell to a private or state monopsony at a low 
price, it is little wonder that many are reluctant to farm on their own account. 
The components of this system most amenable to improvement at the present time are those of 
harvesting and processing losses. On the basis of Figure 7., the situation in which only 36% of the 
potential yield is used for flour milling contains considerable scope for improvement. Measures 
should be taken to further identify the specific causes of losses and devise remedial action plans. Any 
improvements that can be made at the farm level will require the vehicle of an effective extension 
service for successful propagation (see below). There is a pressing need for a detailed study of the 
nature of losses and how best to proceed in addressing these problems. 
An important issue at the present time is that of de-monopolisation. It can be argued that, because of 
the remoteness of many farms and the lack of sufficient local demand for farm services, it will be 
difficult to establish effective competition in supply and processing industries within rural areas. 
Largely this is true and therefore care needs to be taken in ensuring that such monopoly power is not 
abused. However in attempting to understand the reasons for poor performance in agriculture it is 
appropriate to compare again with the situation in North America. In the states of the great plains in 
The USA and the Canadian provinces the problems of remoteness are similar and in many cases 
farmers have little choice but to use their local supplier or travel large distances in search of an 
alternative. The farmer does benefit however from the competition amongst machinery 
manufacturers at the wider, national level. 
In the context of processing industries, low prices which in part may be due to monopsonistic actors 
in this area, will act as an incentive to move processing onto the farm. This has the effect of adding 
value as well as by-passing the large flour mills. Success in doing do will require capital for 
investment and opportunities to sell into the wholesale and/or retail sectors. 
5.3. Alternative Farming Systems 
Assuming that it is possible to capture some of the losses in the present system and/or to acknowledge 
that economic efficiency would be better served by ceasing wheat production on the most marginal 
land, it becomes appropriate to consider the alternative possibilities for land use. The problem is 
very complex and there is no easy "quick fix" solution. The suggestions that follow are explored in 
outline only and will require detailed study to assess their true viability. All these suggestions are 
predicated upon the following set of assumptions
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i) the external resources for financing the necessary investments can be secured; 
ii) that there would not be undue resistance to the adoption of new ideas on the part of farmers; and 
iii) that necessary infrastructure in the form of research, extension and training facilities be in place 
to ensure that the expected benefits of improved agronomic practice can indeed be realised. 
5.3.1. Research and Extension 
This last point impinges upon the very important subject of agricultural research and extension. It is 
very clear that there are opportunities for improving the performance of arable farming systems in 
Mongolia and it is also clear that there is no one easy solution to this problem. It is possible that 
farming methods that have been found to be effective in other parts of the world with similar growing 
conditions could be applied. However, these will need to be tested, evaluated and adapted for use in 
Mongolian conditions. Such tasks would ordinarily fall to an extension service however this is not so 
straightforward at the present because there is no extension service as the term is generally 
understood. 
Technical advice at farm level was generally provided by a team of specialists within the State Farm 
management structure. Agronomists, engineers, livestock specialists and veterinarians would be 
responsible for day-to-day decision making in relation to crop and animal husbandry. The 70 State 
Farms were fully integrated into the Ministry of Agriculture and so many decisions (including all those 
of a strategic nature) were taken at this level. The diffusion of new ideas came via a top down route 
and technological packages were imposed upon the farms rather than being adopted by them. In 
addition to this many of the techniques in use have been transferred from other CMEA countries for 
use in Mongolia with little adaptation to local conditions. 
A crop research station was established at Darkhan in 1942 and was upgraded to institute status in 
1963. It is the remit of the institute to carry out trial work on all forms of crop production relevant to 
Mongolia, and it is here (and at field stations elsewhere in the country) that work has been done to 
determine appropriate crop husbandry. Despite the efforts of Mongolian scientists the production 
systems do rely very heavily on Russian dryland farming methods, often developed more then twenty 
five years ago. It is perhaps worth mentioning that there are other production systems in place on the 
State Farms that are simply direct transfers of Eastern European technology. Mechanised dairy 
production would be a good example. The ADB feed improvement project intends to include the 
strengthening of the research and development capacity of such bodies. 
Whatever the most appropriate course of action for addressing the problems the present weakness in 
the institutional capacity will act as a serious constraint upon agrarian development. Privatisation 
alone will not deliver more efficient and sustainable farming systems. Because conditions of 
employment in the public sector have seriously deteriorated in recent months, the existing 
institutional capacity is fast being eroded. Therefore the immediate objective will be to retain staff as 
well as to retrain them. 
5.3.2. Conservation Tillage Systems 
The standard practice in Mongolia at present is to employ a form of stubble mulching methods 
together with mechanical weed control during the fallow period. The residue from the previous crop 
is mulched to provide a cover during the fallow period. This can be effective in reducing risk of wind 
erosion and improving soil moisture retention. However in practice the fallow is not well managed 
and many of the potential benefits are lost. If weeds and volunteers are allowed to grow the result is 
a loss of soil moisture and nutrients and the purpose of the fallow is undermined. Mechanical weed 
control is also undesirable as it is costly, can lead to loss of soil moisture and it exposes the soil to the 
possibility of wind erosion. 
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No-till and minimal tillage systems are beginning to be adopted in North America. They offer the 
benefits of improved weed control, reduced moisture loss and a lower risk of soil erosion using less 
machinery. Three main types may be identified, these being stubble mulch, ecofallow and no-till. 
Stubble mulching employs minimal tillage operations designed to retain as much of the crops residue 
as possible. Ecofallow uses a combination of tillage and chemical sprays such as glyphosate, a 
translocated, systemic general purpose herbicide, to control weeds. In this way soil disturbance is 
minimised. The final method, no-till, relies entirely on chemicals for weed control. 
Conservation tillage methods require a high standard of husbandry to be effective. This is particularly 
true at sowing time. The drill penetration, sowing depth and seed rate need to be carefully 
monitored. Specially adapted seed drills able to cut through the crop residue are also needed. The 
benefits are however attractive. Data from the Montana Extension Service suggest that no-till 
methods can increase soil moisture storage by 49% over conventionally tilled fallow, and stubble 
mulching by 40%. 
The decision about sowing a crop or fallowing land can be made subject the soil moisture conditions 
at the time. Decision support systems to enable informed judgements on cropping strategies are 
available and could be introduced relatively easily. 
5.3.3. Legume Rotations 
The ADB Feeds Improvement project proposes some interesting ideas for improving the overall 
productivity of arable land. They suggest some rotations in which both wheat and leguminous fodder 
crops feature. They conclude that much of the fallow management is poorly done and the potential 
benefits are lost. An alternative offering more productive use of the fallow period would be plant a 
legume crop such as field pea (ADB, 1992, Appendix III p42). By harvesting the legume crop for hay 
in late August a potential yield of 2 tonnes per ha would be available. This would then leave time for 
moisture accumulation for the following grain crop which would also benefit from the additional 
nitrogen from the legume crop. The effect of this is estimated to be worth about 0.5 tonnes per ha 
extra yield in the following wheat crop. Alternatively the legume crop could be allowed to mature 
and be harvested a a pulse grain crop but with a reduced amount of nitrogen available for the 
following crop. 
Amongst other agronomic possibilities is the inclusion of brassicas in the rotation. These include 
rape, kale and turnips and beet (which is not a brassica but offers similar possibilities). These crops 
are more suited to grazing in situ rather than harvesting and using for fodder, although if distance 
permits zero-grazing for housed dairy cattle would be possible. 
Another crop identified by the ADB team is canola, a high quality rapeseed. It is suggested that a 
pea-wheat-canola rotation could be suitable for Mongolian conditions. Canola yields of about 1 
tonne per ha should be possible. Of this 30% would be oil and 70% meal for animal feed. 
Long ley rotations are also suggested in the ADB report. A long-term legume ley (i.e. 4 to 6 years) 
would followed by a period of similar length of continuous wheat cropping. Lucerne appears to be 
the most suitable legume currently available. During the legume phase both soil fertility and 
structure should be improved. Yields of lucerne hay would vary between 2.5 and 4.0 tonnes per ha 
depending on rainfall. The wheat yields should average 1.25 tonnes per ha over a 4 to 5 year wheat 
cropping phase. 
On the face of it these possibilities appear Very attractive. However more work is needed to further 
quantify the potential and identify the problems in relation to introducing workable rotations. This is 
likely to include: 
• identifying the areas in which particular packages are most suitable and tailoring 
recommendations to local conditions; and 
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• addressing the problems of unfamiliarity and caution on the part of farmers. It has already been 
suggested that farmer-innovation was not a common feature on the State Farms. Because of the 
uncertain economic climate there are not likely to be a great many innovators in agriculture in 
the short term. 
Careful planning and canvassing of farmer opinion will be needed to prevent inappropriate and 
unattractive solutions being offered. A thorough audit of the land resources, opportunities and threats 
will also lessen the risk of unhelpful interventions. 
5.4. Environmental Implications 
Reference has been made to some of the environmental problems that have been associated with 
arable cropping in Mongolia. Improved agronomic management should both address the problem of 
low productivity and environmental degradation at the same time. The Mongolian authorities are 
aware of environmental damage resulting from certain forms of land use. In the most extreme cases, 
crop land has been abandoned because of degradation. 
An exhaustive analysis of the social costs and returns within agriculture should embrace 
environmental impacts. In practice these effects often remain externalities, uncosted within the 
accounting framework and this is indeed the case also in this study. However, such is nature of 
wheat production that it is the most economically marginal areas that are those most at risk of 
environmental damage. Examination of the history of cropping together with accompanying records 
of problems of erosion, fertility etc. and expert judgement should identify those sites where these 
problems are most pressing. Where there is a history of declining yields as a result of environmental 
degradation one possible method of incorporating this effect into the economic analysis would be to 
project forward the declining yield (together with any additional costs) and calculate the annual 
budgets from the present value of the future flows. The Aimag production data presented in this 
paper are too aggregated to permit such an approach at this stage. 
It is ironic that one of the fears of the authorities as agriculture privatised is that private farmers may 
not manage the land in a sustainable manner. Mongolia has not suffered some the excessive 
environmental disasters which have beset some of the other former centrally-planned economies. 
Perhaps because it is sparsely populated and did not undergo a rapid industrialisation it was spared 
these problems. However, the ingredients for such were in place and did result in localised 
problems. The irony follows from the role of the state, which has a tendency to become confused in 
these matters. The setting of production targets and responsibility for allocating resources proved 
difficult to reconcile with the role of protector of the environment. Often the short term objective of 
output was achieved at the expense of the environment (and the well-being of workers in many 
cases). Environmental conservation appears to be high on the agenda at the present time. This 
should form an significant element of the rubric governing developments in agriculture. 
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6. FARM MANAGEMENT 
Many of the problems of poor performance can be traced to deficiencies in the organisation and 
quality of management on the farm. This is in turn is a result of constraints within which the farm 
managers have had to operate and poor incentives and rewards structures for success. In practice the 
command economy created a reward system which was linked to the attainment of pre-determined 
targets and usually ignored more important indicators of technical and economic efficiency. The lack 
of rigour in critically assessing the performance of farm businesses together with the lenient budgetary 
constraints imposed these enterprises have allowed the inefficient and unprofitable to remain in 
business. Ultimately it was not possible to countenance enterprises in State ownership to go bankrupt 
although many were and are technically insolvent. 
One of the effects of having farm production targets determined by central planners was that local 
managers had responsibility for only the most immediate, day-to-day decisions. And even in this 
respect there was often little room for manoeuvre because of external constraints. The farm inputs 
supplied were based on a prescribed package rather than allowing managers to determine 
requirements and purchase items accordingly. Similarly there was little scope for improving returns 
by better marketing or adding value on the farm. 
Figure 8. (adapted from Daw, 1990) provides a breakdown of the management problems that tend to 
beset State Farms. The problems that beset the large scale farms are multi-factorial and generally 
complex. Understanding the relative importance of different constraints and assessing the ease with 
they can be addressed is a pressing requirement. As far as farm performance is concerned, a simple 
classification is helpful in understanding the reasons for poor achievement. 
i) Factors endogenous to the farm system, for example: 
® skills and training of staff in particular those required to operate and service machinery and 
those charged with production management decision making; 
® poor incentives for staff due to lack of appropriate remuneration and insufficient 
responsibility for decision making, leading to low morale; 
® remote and ineffective management. 
Inappropriate 
choice of 
products 
Inappropriate 
systems 
of production 
Inadequate and 
over-centralised 
planning 
Inadequate resources 
Remote decision making 
Weak management 
Low staff morale 
Poor farm supplies 
High post-harvest losses 
Interest on accumulated debt 
Heavy and remote administration 
High mechanisation costs 
Inappropriate production systems 
Wasteage of inputs 
Figure 8. Problems of management on State Farms 
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ii) Factors external to the farm but within the food-chain hierarchy, for example: 
• the cost, quality and reliability of supply of factors of production; 
• inappropriate and rigid farm plans determined by central planners; 
• the efficiency of the food processing, distribution and marketing system; 
iii) Macroeconomic policy measures, including: 
• exchange rate policy; 
• commodity price policy; 
• interest rates and fiscal policy. 
In practice the actual performance of farms is a result of the interaction of all of these with the added 
risk and uncertainty of a severe and often unpredictable climate. So far this does not seem to have 
been well understood in Mongolia. Given the radical and unpredictable nature of economic 
transformation on the one hand, and the inherent inertia and naivete on the other, it is not surprising 
to find that the effects of many policy decisions can be quite difficult for farmers to cope with. 
The problem facing the policy analyst is that of understanding the nature of the interaction of these 
three sets of forces. The focus of this study has been primarily on the production side with some 
reference to the wider issues that impinge upon farmers. 
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7. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SYSTEMS OF WHEAT PRODUCTION 
This chapter explains in detail the adopted approach in modelling the economics of wheat 
production in Mongolia. 
7.1. Methodology 
A widely used approach to the analysis of agricultural policy, particularly in developing countries, 
involves the construction of partial equilibrium models based on micro-level commodity systems. 
These can be used to provide estimates of comparative advantage once the appropriate social prices 
for items in the budget have been estimated and these items have been classified (and decomposed 
where necessary) as domestic (non-tradable) and tradable. Convention lays down that social prices 
for tradables be derived from prevailing world market prices with appropriate adjustments for 
transport costs. Non-tradable domestic factors should ideally be valued at their opportunity cost to 
the economy as a whole though this is intrinsically a much more difficult task. The Policy Analysis 
Matrix (PAM) (see Monke and Pearson, 1989) provides a systematic approach to the investigation of 
these issues. The PAM incorporates two accounting identities providing measures of profitability on 
the one hand and the effects of divergences on the other. 
As with any model the PAM represents an abstraction from reality and as such is inevitably flawed. 
Any analytical technique is open to criticism on the basic of theoretical rigour and effectiveness of 
implementation. In many cases it is the availability and quality of data that have the greatest bearing 
on the validity of the model. The present situation in Mongolia poses a number of problems which 
make the analysis of policy both difficult and error-prone. The first point is that these analytical tools 
are predicated on there being a consistent and managed policy environment. In the last two years 
the policy environment has been somewhat unstable, and even when policy measures have been 
clearly determined there has often been a manifest failure to implement them in a universally 
consistent manner. The means that the opportunities available to producers at the local along with 
the constraints placed upon them can vary markedly. Any 'representative' sectoral model will fail to 
capture these facets. Because of the short shelf-life of many policy instruments during the transition 
period, an important feature of the wheat sector model is the ease with which key assumptions can 
be varied and the results recalculated. The highly disaggregated nature of the model also allows the 
user to examine fundamental assumptions in the technology of production and make adjustments as 
required. 
The command economy was characterised by the propensity to collect large quantities of data, much 
of which were unformed and little used in analysis. Unfortunately the accounting conventions 
employed also often lead to performance indicators that were not suitable for either farm business 
analysis or agricultural policy analysis. Even measures of physical performance were often 
inappropriate and, without access to the raw, disaggregated data at farm level, recalculation of 
improved indicators would not be possible. 
The wheat sector model therefore has been built from first principles and is based on data and 
information from three main sources, these being: 
• Ministry of Agriculture records 
The Ministry of Agriculture retains aggregate records from the State farms. Unfortunately these 
tend to be mostly financial statements with minimal physical data. Data for a number of aimags 
were abstracted for the period 1983 to 1989 and from these records estimates of resource use and 
output were obtained. The aimags were chosen to represent the range of agro-climatic zones in 
which wheat is grown. The choice of seven years was considered sufficient to indicate the 
variability of production over time. Physical input-output coefficients were estimated by dividing 
the aggregates by the unit price at the time. The values obtained were then compared with those 
estimated by other means. 
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® Norms and standards 
Certain data such as fertiliser application rates and machinery requirements and work rates were 
based on published standards (usually referred to as 'norms'). One problem with these standard 
work rates is that they appear to be invariably optimistic, most probably because they capture 
what may be termed "best practice" rather than the poorer performance that would be typical. As 
a result there is usually a discrepancy between the norms and the records of aggregate labour and 
machinery use on the farms. For this reason the norm coefficients have usually been modified to 
reflect more realistic work rates. Similarly the fertiliser usage indicated by the records is often 
well below the recommended levels, often because of supply failures. 
• Interviews with local experts 
A series of interviews were arranged to ensure that estimates derived from other sources were 
consistent with expert opinion. Discussions took place with Ministry of Agriculture economists 
and agronomists, staff of the Agricultural Supply Service, the Crop Production Research Institute 
and the Agricultural University. 
Wherever possible estimates were based on a resolution of data from all three sources, although in a 
number of cases there were some anomalies that could not be easily resolved. In particular these 
were the result of substantial differences between the norms and the historic averages. 
7.2. Model Structure 
In order to allow the investigation of changes in both prices and technical coefficients a 
disaggregated spreadsheet model has been constructed. This model is an important companion to 
this report because it permits the investigation of various policy scenarios. In particular it was 
considered an important component for the following reasons. 
• The single commodity system budget is based on representative average values. The model 
permits sensitivity analysis to be carried out thereby permitting the investigation of production in 
different agro-climatic zones, under differing economic circumstances etc. 
• Although every effort was made to ensure the validity of components of the model, it is accepted 
that some of the assumptions may be flawed. A disaggregated approach permits the examination 
and alteration values should this be required. 
• The model is based on the technical input-output relationships that prevailed during the 1980's 
which, for reasons explained elsewhere, are unlikely to remain representative. Because these 
coefficients are explicitly defined in the model, they can be readily examined and altered as 
appropriate. 
• The wheat budget can be used as a template for the construction of other agricultural commodity 
system budgets 
The components of the model that follow represent the baseline configuration from which the 
scenario results have been derived. 
7.3. Crop Output 
The main output, grain, is generally classified into one of three categories. Classes I and II are 
considered suitable for milling for flour. The third category is wheat which is sub-standard and 
therefore used for animal concentrate feed. Only 2% of the grain is premium quality, 58% is class II 
and the remaining 40% is downgraded to animal feed. The price of wheat is taken as referring to the 
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class II quality with a premium of 15% payable for class I and a deduction of 10% for sub-standard10. 
The criteria for the classification are shown in table 19. 
Table 19. Classification of wheat quality 
Class 
1 
Class 
II 
Animal 
Feed 
Wet Gluten (%) > 28 18-28 <18 
Screenings (%) < 2 2-15 >15 
Rubble (%) < 2 2-5 > 5 
Moisture (%) < = 1 7 17-19 >19 
1 litre wt(g) >740 700-740 <700 
Data from the flour and feed combinants show the mean moisture content of delivered grain to be in 
the region of 18%. Internationally traded grain would have a moisture content of 14% or lower and 
so the yield rate is adjusted to account for this. The budget provides for the inclusion of an estimate 
of losses between harvest and the delivery to the mill. 
For this initial analysis no account has been taken of the value of the straw, although the model does 
provide for the inclusion of this if desired. 
Historically grain is sold "off the combine" as storage for seed only is available on farms. The price 
therefore is based on sale in October. No information on seasonal variations in grain price was 
obtained. 
7.4. Variable Costs 
7.4.1. Seed 
A seed rate of 200 kg ha"1 is used. The seed is assumed to have the same value as class II milling 
wheat. 
7.4.2. Fertiliser 
The Ministry of Agriculture agronomists recommend application rates of 50-60 kg ha"1 of nitrogen, 
40-60 kg ha"1 of phosphorus and 30-40 kg ha"1 of potassium. 
The cost of fertiliser in the Aimag summaries is shown as a per hectare cost for all fertiliser and the 
costs (and therefore the amounts) of individual crop nutrients cannot be identified. In order to 
determine typical (as opposed to recommended) application rates it was necessary to assume a 
constant ratio of N:P:K and by using the unit cost of each nutrient, estimate the total quantity of 
fertiliser applied. During the period 1983-89 the domestic prices of N, P and K were 480, 650 and 
350 Tg per tonne respectively. Taking a ratio of nutrients of 55% N, 30% P and 15% K , the mean 
cost of 34 Tg per ha for Selenge and Tuv aimags suggests that application rates of 39 kg ha"1 N, 21 kg 
ha-1 P and 11 kg ha"1 K are more representative of recent practice11. The data on total fertiliser 
imports during this period reinforce this assumption as the quantities imported do not correspond 
with the recommended application rates. 
10These adjustments are based on typical differentials for grain traded in international markets. The author is grateful to Cargills 
Technical services for this information. 
11 In the report on the Jargalant State Farm by the MoA/FAO Farm Management team, the authors indicate that first year wheat 
receives 100 kg ha"1 of urea (i.e. 46 kg of N) together with 20 kg ha" "of phosphorus. The higher rate of nitrogen would be 
consistent with the fact that this farm enjoys better than average growing conditions. (Mean yields are around 1.251 ha"'). The 
conclusion to be drawn is that fertiliser usage, in common with other aspects of farm production, can differ substantially from 
officially stated norms and standards. 
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7.4.3. Sprays and Chemical Treatments 
The only chemical application is 2,4-D for the control of broad-leaved weeds at a recommended rate 
of application of 1 kg per ha. The data for Tuv and Selenge suggest a value of 1.5 litres per ha, which 
is more or less comparable. 
Seed is treated with organo-mercuric (or possibly zinc-based) compound as a precaution against 
seed-borne diseases such as black smut. 
7.5. Machinery Costs 
Machinery costs are a major component of the overall costs of wheat production, and in keeping with 
the approach of this study, they have been decomposed so that the performance and usage 
assumptions are transparent. Machinery costs are also an area in which variability between farms 
can be most pronounced. 
7.5.1. Machinery Complement and Work Rates 
An inventory is used as the basis calculate the annual holding costs of farm machinery. The 
inventory is based on the requirements of 1000 ha of wheat together with the associated fallow land. 
This approach assumes a wheat monoculture which in most cases is justified. In the situation of 
mixed cropping systems it would be necessary to apportion the machinery on a pro rata basis. These 
machinery complements are based on State farm inventories reconciled to national statistics on 
agricultural machinery. The spreadsheet model allows easy modification of the machinery data in 
order to permit the analysis of farm-specific situations. 
The values in table 20. can be modified by the user as required. Each machine has an alpha-numeric 
code to allow specific identification. The initial cost is shown in dollars at the prices quoted by the 
ASS in November 1992. Standard practice at this time would be to convert to domestic currency at 
the official exchange rate with an import duty of 15%. 
Table 20. Machinery Complement for 1000 ha of wheat production and associated fallow land 
Machine Description Number Intial Mean depn Working Repairs 
code per Cost rate life % new 
1000 ha ($) % per annum (years) Value 
CK-5 Combine 4.0 20000 20 7 10 
DT-7S 100hp Crawler Tractor 3.0 16000 20 8 14 
MTZ-50 55 hp Wheeled Tractor 2.5 6000 20 8 16 
T-1S0 Large wheeled (4WD) tractor 1.0 25000 20 8 16 
Truck 0.6 10000 15 10 10 
BIG-3 Harrow 3.0 1250 12 7 6 
KPS-5 Cultivator 4.0 1500 12 7 6 
OVT-1A Sprayer 1.0 1500 18 7 8 
VNB-3 Straw loader 2.5 1200 12 7 7 
2PTS-4 Trailer 2.0 2100 12 7 5 
CBY-2.6 Snow sweeper 1.5 1000 12 7 5 
CZC-2.1 Drill (combine) 4.0 4000 15 7 9 
PSB-1.6 Baler 2.5 2000 18 7 9 
ZKK-6A Roller 2.0 1000 12 7 6 
BOG Caravan 1.0 3000 12 10 3 
Wheat production In Mongolia: an economic analysis ' Page 43 
7.5.2. Annual Capital Charge and Repair Costs 
The machinery inventory is used to calculate the annual costs of owning machinery. The annual 
capital charge is based on the standard annuity calculation (sometimes referred to as the Capital 
Recovery Factor)12 and repair costs use an estimate derived form Ministry of Agriculture records. The 
repair cost estimates do not provide any information as to their composition. Most of the labour for 
repairs and servicing would be supplied by specialist units within the State Farm. It is important to 
understand that these figures are based upon a turnover of machinery based upon the normal 
expected working life of the asset. The salvage value is notional representing the potential for resale 
that exists at the end of the machine's working life. In practice many machines are retained on farms 
until they are no longer serviceable at which point they may be cannibalised for spare parts. 
Table 21. Machinery inventory for WOO ha of wheat and fallow 
Machine Description Salvage PVof Net Initial Capital Annual Repair 
code Value Salvage Cost Recovery Capital Cost Cost 
($) ($) ($) Factor ($) $/year 
CK-S Combine 4194 1676 18324 0.233 17092 8000 
DT-75 100hp Crawler Tractor 2684 941 15059 0.216 9739 6720 
MTZ-50 55 hp Wheeled Tractor 1007 353 5647 0.216 3043 2400 
T-150 Large wheeled (4WD) tractor 4194 1470 23530 0.216 S072 4000 
0 Truck 1969 531 9469 0.192 1089 600 
BIG-3 Harrow 511 204 1046 0.233 732 225 
KPS-5 Cultivator 613 245 1255 0.233 1171 360 
OVT-1A Sprayer 374 149 1351 0.233 315 120 
VNB-3 Straw loader 490 196 1004 0.233 585 210 
2PTS-4 Trailer 858 343 1757 0.233 819 210 
CBY-2.6 Snow sweeper 409 163 837 0.233 293 75 
CZC-2.1 Drill (combine) 1282 512 3488 0.233 3253 1440 
PSB-1.6 Baler 499 199 1801 0.233 1050 450 
ZKK-6A Roller 409 163 837 0.233 390 120 
BOG Caravan 836 225 2775 0.192 532 90 
Total 45175 25020 
Capital Recovery Factor is based on an interest rate of 14 % 
Fuel consumption and work rate data are derived from the norms and standards provided by the 
MoA. In order to verify these data the representative budgets were compared with fuel costs 
aggregates for the selected aimags. The discrepancies were considered to be within the accepted 
parameters given the variable nature of agricultural production. As with other aspects of the model, 
12The method employed for calculating the Annual Capital Cost (ACC) is as follows 
(P-S(l + i)-")i 
ACC 
1 - 0 + 0 " 
where P is the purchase price of the asset, S is the salvage value, I is the (decimal) interest rate and n is the working life in years. 
The salvage value is calculated on the basis of a diminishing balance depreciation charge. The A C C is a constant annual charge 
that, over n years, will repay the capital outlay and cover interest due on the outstanding debt each year. If the capital repayment 
is considered analogous to depreciation then this represents the annual share of the cost of the machine, which in this case is a 
tradable. The interest however is treated as a domestic factor. To this end the (average) depreciation (D) is calculated on a 
simple straight-line basis, viz. 
D p - s ( i + i y 
n 
and the interest is simply ACC-D 
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the highly disaggregated nature of 
these data allows easy examination 
and alteration if desired. The data 
are held in tables that state the per 
ha requirement for the use of a 
particular implement with a given 
power unit. For each combination 
the fuel consumption (litres ha-1), 
operator labour (hours ha-1) and 
supplementary labour requirement 
are stored. In table 22. below, the 
first four columns can be readily 
altered to represent the sequence 
of operations that take place. The 
implement and power unit 
columns contain the codes that 
match those in the look-up table. 
The remaining columns show the calculated values that are used in the budget. 
The cost of lubricants has, for the present, been ignored. The facility to add a coefficient to represent 
efficiency losses also provides a method for including items such as this. 
Table 22. Machinery hours and fuel usage for wheat production and fallow management 
Wheat growing Timing Implement Power unit Fuel/ha Hrs/1000 ha Supp hrs Days/ha Days reqd 
Snow sweeping Feb CBY-2.6 DT-75 2.5 196 0 25 8.2 
Harrowing Apr BIG-3 DT-75 2.9 200 0 25 8.3 
Cultivation - first May KPS-S DT-75 8.0 476 0 60 19.8 
Cultivation - second May KPS-5 T-150 6.9 238 0 30 29.8 
Rolling May ZKK-6A MTZ-50 2.0 161 0 20 8.1 
Sowing May CZC-2.1 DT-75 5.2 455 455 57 18.9 
Spraying Jun OVT-1A MTZ-50 0.9 154 1S4 19 7.7 
Windrowing Sep CK-5 CK-5 5.2 526 0 66 16.4 
Threshing Sep NiVA CK-5 7.5 476 0 60 14.9 
Baling Oct PSB-1.6 MTZ-50 3.5 556 556 69 27.8 
Bale loading Oct VNB-3 MTZ-S0 1.3 313 313 39 15.6 
Total 45.9 3751 1476 469 176 
Fallow management Timing Implement Power unit Fuel/ha Hrs/1000 ha Supp hrs Days/ha Days reqd 
Cultivation Jun KPS-S DT-75 8.0 476 0 60 19.8 
Spraying Jun OVT-1A MTZ-50 0.9 154 154 19 7.7 
Cultivation Jul KPS-S DT-75 8.0 476 0 60 19.8 
Cultivation Jul KPS-5 DT-75 8.0 476 0 60 19.8 
Harrowing Aug BIG-3 DT-75 2.9 200 0 25 8.3 
Total 27.8 1782 154 223 76 
Figure 9. shows the machinery requirements for 1 hectare of wheat together with 0.5 ha fallow. May 
and September are the peak months because of sowing and harvest. The summer months tend to be 
dominated by operations to manage the fallow land, although the wheat crop itself requires little 
attention at this time. Being a monoculture based system constrained by the narrow growing season 
the need for timeous field operations is paramount and so equipment needs to be both serviceable 
and efficient. 
MacNnery hours 
1400 
1 2 0 0 - -
1000 
600 --
400 
200 
i l Wheat operations 
I Fallow operations 
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—H 
Aug Sep Oct Nov Deo 
H 
Figure 9. Machinery requirements for 1000 ha wheat plus 500 ha fallow 
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Petrol use on farms is nominally quite high. Table 13. shows that over the years 1987-89 the amount 
of petrol used on the State Farms was about 40% the level of diesel usage. Much of this results from 
the requirement to collect farm inputs from central depots rather than having them delivered by the 
supplier. The full costs of owning and operating a fleet of farm-based trucks therefore appear in the 
farm accounts. Because of the desirability of separating the farm production costs from those costs 
which are essentially ancillary, the transport costs for inputs and outputs have been included in the 
calculation of farm gate prices. Fuel for trucks used on the farm however is entered separately. 
Machinery costs are important in the context of wheat production and merit further consideration. 
The agricultural technology in place in Mongolia will necessitate continued reliance upon Russian 
manufactures unless and until they are replaced by those of Western origin. The degree to which this 
will occur is a matter of some conjecture. Although it is widely acknowledged that the Russian 
equipment is inferior to its western counterparts it is also considerably cheaper. A factor of three 
would not be at all unusual. In the long term, under market conditions, this price difference should 
reflect the additional costs of operating these machines. In the short term western machines are only 
likely to make inroads when funded by external sources such as aid projects. The inferior quality of 
equipment does however lead to a set of costs which are difficult to both identify and quantify but 
would include: 
• Higher repair costs 
• Higher fuel consumption 
• More frequent breakdowns leading to loss of timeliness (in an agro-climatic situation such as 
Mongolia being able to exploit weather windows can be critical and the effect of this problem 
should not be under-estimated) 
• Operational inefficiency e.g. difficulty in adjusting machines optimally, grain losses from 
combines, incorrect sprayer and fertiliser calibration. 
It is also interesting to note that this situation represents a serious cost to the Russian economy in 
terms of the earnings foregone because of price discounting for inferior quality. In building a tractor, 
for example, inputs of metal, labour, energy etc. would be needed much the same as in the 
construction of a US tractor. The difference is that the US model commands a higher end price. If 
the factors of production were costed at world price levels then the Russian industry would show 
significantly lower value-added than its US equivalent. In extreme cases, many of manufacturing 
activities can actually be value-subtractors in which case the logical course of action would be to 
cease production. 
Because the slack budgetary constraints of the past there has been a tendency to over-invest in 
machinery to provide apparent over-capacity as form of insurance. The quality deficiency has been 
compensated by quantity. With the move to trading on a hard currency foreign exchange basis it is 
likely this will change. Despite the relative cheapness of Russian farm equipment, the scarcity of 
foreign exchange has meant that imports during the last few years have plummeted. This 
disinvestment means that the over-capacity will soon be eroded and the already poor productivity is 
likely to be further undermined. 
7.6. Buildings and Fixed Capital 
The buildings and fixed plant complement proved difficult to determine. The minimum requirement 
would include. 
• grain dressing equipment 
• on-floor storage for 200 tonnes for every 1000 hectares sown 
• garaging and workshops for farm machinery 
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As with the farm machinery, these cost of these items of durable capital are converted to annual 
amounts using a capital recovery factor. Domestic labour costs are more likely to account for a 
significant proportion of the total costs than is the case with machinery. For this reason a coefficient 
is introduced into the schedule to denote the proportion of total cost which is considered domestic. 
Table 23. Schedule of plant and buildings for 1000 ha of wheat 
Description Intial Working Repair Proportion Capital Annual Repair 
Cost life % new Domestic Recovery Capital Cost Cost 
($) (years) Value Factor ($) $/year 
Grain cleaning equipment 5000 8 7 0.2 0.216 1078 350 
Grain storage for 200 tonnes 14000 20 2 0.5 0.151 2114 280 
Machinery garaging 20000 20 2 0.5 0.151 3020 400 
Total 6211 1030 
7.7. Prices 
The estimation of prices poses a number of problems. Private prices are normally obtained by 
observation of markets and to some extent this is straightforward. The problems of poor 
dissemination of price data have been already intimated. The collapse of the administered price 
system has meant that pan-territorial price uniformity has been largely supplanted by prices which 
reflect distribution costs, if only implicitly. Because farms have to arrange the collection of farm 
inputs from centraI distribution centres the effective farm-gate price is high than the quoted price. 
This will clearly disadvantage those farms located in remote areas and/or served by poor 
communications. Further to this, the emerge of unofficial markets and the growing volume of barter 
transactions make the collection of actual prices being paid very difficult. Barter trade is by its nature 
often localised and opportunistic and the 'deals' available at any one place at any one time reflect 
local supply and demand. The private prices used in this study have been based primarily on data 
available at the MoA and the Agricultural University. 
The standard practice with regard to price setting of imports is to convert into domestic currency at 
the official rate and to add a universal import duty, currently standing at 15%. This has been done 
with the machinery and plant costs. For the other tradables, table 24. shows the relationship between 
observed prices and the domestic price calculated using the above method. There is reasonable 
correspondence although for some goods, notably petrol, the observed price is much higher. The 
reason for this is simple: the shortage has necessitated a system of rationing but there is considerable 
leakage into parallel markets which seems to be widely tolerated. 
Table 24. Comparison of observed prices and calculated prices using the official exchange rate 
Wheat Amm Nitr TSP KCI Diesel Petrol Sprays Seed Tr 
Observed price (Tg) 
Calculated price 
(Tg) 
7000 
10S80 
10000 
7820 
12000 
12420 
8000 
6900 
10000 
9430 
26000 
11730 
200 
193 
600 
377 
Prices for inputs appear to be on the basis that the purchaser collects the goods. For wheat grain 
transport costs from the dressing centre to the mill are borne by the combinant. The domestic farm-
gate prices for inputs have been calculated by adding a haulage charge of 4 Tg per tonne per 
kilometre. 
The calculation of social prices also presents a number of methodological problems. Mongolia 
suffers considerable geographical disadvantages in respect of international trade. It is a land-locked 
country with no guaranteed access to a sea port. Goods must pass through either Russia or China. In 
the past the majority of trade was with the CMEA countries and therefore the links with the FSU 
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assumed greatest importance. In terms of the volume of trade this is likely to remain the case for the 
short to medium term given that the activities of the Mongolian economy were integrated into the 
CMEA trading bloc. 
In the spreadsheet model the farm gate social prices are calculated on the following basis. 
For inputs the steps are: 
FOB price at recognised exporting port for the good concerned 
plus Freight and insurance costs from this port to a nominated port in China or 
appropriate location in Russia 
plus Unloading, freight and insurance for transport from this location to Ulaan Baatar 
(ULN) 
equals Wholesale price in ULN 
To this are added the transportation costs of moving the goods from Ulaan Baatar to the farm. The 
costs have been calculated using a schedule in the spreadsheet model. The costs per kilometre are 
calculated as follows: 
Table 25. Transport costs schedule based on a five tonne Russian truck 
Five tonne Russian truck 
Domestic haulage charge (Tg per t per km) 4 
Truck capacity (tonnes) S 
Initial cost of truck ($) 10000 
Servicing & Repair cost as % of initial cost 10 
Life (years) 10 
Fuel consumption (litres/km) 0.37 
Annual distance covered (kms) 20000 
Annual cost ($) 1770 
Summary of non-domestic costs (US cents per tonne per km) 
Amortisation 1.77 
Repairs 1.00 
Fuel 1.36 
Total 4.13 
The resulting amount is converted to domestic currency at the official exchange rate and then 
adjusted to account for estimated over-valuation of the Tugrik. 
Import parity prices for the output (grain) is calculated on the same basis with the difference that the 
point of consumption is assumed to be Ulaan Baatar and so transport costs are subtracted from the 
wholesale price to give the farm gate price. 
Specific problems associated with the estimation of prices include the following: 
• Obtaining data on the costs of transport from Tianjin to Ulaan Baatar proved to be very difficult. 
To date very little grain has been brought in via this route although it would be the only one 
practical for the importation of wheat. Anecdotal evidence suggested that charges of up to US$ 
100 per tonne for the transport of grain could be expected. The ADB project document attempts 
to estimate farm gate economic prices for hay and other products and, in doing so, use values 
which corroborate a cost of this magnitude. A number of factors contribute to this situation. 
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First, the change in rail gauge at the border necessitates unloading and reloading of cargo. This is 
costly and time-consuming because of the inadequacy of facilities at the border. Because so little 
bulk freight has crossed the border in the past there has not been the incentive to address this 
problem. As a result the process is extremely inefficient and these costs would tend to be passed. 
Secondly, this monopoly position affords the Chinese opportunity to seek high rents for this 
service. There are of course number of political considerations, beyond the scope and remit of 
this study, that further complicate this issue13. In the long term investment in improving the 
efficiency of this transport link should bring the cost down. 
Strictly the costs of transport from Tianjin should be split between the Chinese part of the journey 
and the remainder which is in Mongolia. The latter would be partly dependent on domestic 
resources (mostly labour) and partly on imports (fuel, spares, equipment etc.) Because of the 
difficulties in identifying a single charge for the transport and the fact the domestic costs 
represent a small fraction of the total cost, a single rate per tonne has been adopted. 
• Because the infrastructure in Mongolia is poorly developed and the distances between farms and 
centres of population can be substantial, the costs incurred in moving materials between them 
can have an important bearing on the real costs and returns of crop production. These costs are 
often borne by the farms themselves although the cost of moving grain from the collection centre 
to the mill is covered by the milling combinant. Wherever possible these costs have been 
explicitly calculated. 
• A feature of the prices of imports from the FSU is that they appear to be significantly cheaper 
than the equivalent products manufactured in Western countries. In many cases the price 
differential reflects the difference in quality; in order to clear in competitive markets many goods 
from the ex-CMEA countries need to be discounted. It has been noted elsewhere that machinery 
may be as much as three times cheaper than equivalent western items. For other goods the 
reasons for the price differential are less obvious. A good example would be nitrogenous 
fertiliser. The world price of ammonium nitrate is around US$120 per tonne whereas it can be 
obtained from the Russians at the equivalent of US$90 per tonne. On the face of it is difficult to 
understand why there should be this difference. It may be explained in part by quality 
differences, especially because of poor packaging resulting in spoilage. Another possible reason 
for this discrepancy is the fact that for the large part many of the ex-CMEA countries have not 
developed significant trading links with the rest of the world. Although all trade is supposed to 
be on a hard currency basis, many of the operational trading practices owe much to the former 
system. Prices of traded goods were denominated in transferable roubles and were reviewed on 
a five year basis. This would tend to instil a degree of inertia and lack of price response. In the 
long term one might reasonably argue that, provided the goods are of competitive quality, then 
the opportunity cost to the exporting country is the world price for the good. In order to capture 
this, world prices have been used for all imported tradables with the exception of machinery. In 
this analysis world prices have been used for all items apart from machinery. 
• Ultimately price may be irrelevant if supply cannot be secured. During the transitional phase 
many enterprises have found it increasing difficult to obtain essential supplies, even if the finance 
for procurement is available. Failures at a national and international level lead to 
insurmountable problems at farm level. This is a legacy of the high degree of dependency on the 
FSU in this sector. The true picture is very confused as there have been instances of farms by-
passing state procurement procedures and importing machinery and spare parts directly. 
Statistics on these activities are understandably difficult to obtain but it appears to be a growing 
trend. In these cases much depends on the local opportunities and therefore there is much 
variability. Cross-border trading, for example, is only available to those close enough to the 
border and have goods or services worth bartering. 
a This last issue of barter merits further consideration. The use of barter trading is a rational 
response to conditions of high inflation in the economy. It is also likely to be attractive when 
13lt Is Interesting to note that a Canadian farmer would have to pay a charge of US$ 14 per tonne for the transport of grain over a 
distance of one thousand miles (i.e. the distance between Ulaan Baatar and Tianjin). This figure represents 35% of the estimated 
economic cost of the rail transport (i.e. US$ 40 per tonne). Obviously there are many differences between Canada and 
China/Mongolia but the figure does provide a useful benchmark for transport costs for a longer term analysis. 
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there is apprehension about new forms of taxation. In some sectors of the economy the scope for 
barter is greater than it is in others. 
Table 26. below shows the baseline prices schedule for tradable inputs and outputs. Machinery is 
treated separately. Wheat is assumed to be fob US west coast with shipping to Tianjin and then rail 
freight to Ulaan Baatar. All other inputs are sourced in the in the CIS although the actual locations 
are unspecified. For this reason there is no explicit charge for the freight and insurance to an 
intermediate port as there would be with imports via China, and the cost is treated as fob at Irkutsk 
near the Russian-Mongolian border. In practice the imports would be loaded onto rail wagons on the 
Trans-Siberian railway and routed via Irkutsk into Mongolia. 
Table 26. Schedule for parity prices used in wheat production model 
Item Wheat Amm Nitr TSP KCi Diesel Petrol Sprays Seed Tr 
Units tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes litres litres 
Domestic price (Tg) 7000 10000 12000 8000 10000 26000 200 600 
Domestic farm-gate price (Tg) 7000 10800 12800 8800 10800 26800 201 601 
International prices (US $) 
fob at.. WC-USA CIS CIS CIS CIS CIS CIS CIS 
Fob price at above 120 160 250 140 180 230 4 8 
Freight & Insurance 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
cif at.. Tianjin Irkutsk Irkutsk Irkutsk Irkutsk Irkutsk Irkutsk Irkutsk 
Unloading 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Freight & insurance overland to ULN 80 20 20 20 25 25 0.2 0.2 
Wholesale price at ULN (cif) 230 180 270 160 205 255 4.2 8.2 
Transport costs 
Farm -> mill 4.9 
Mill -> ULN 7.3 
ULN -> farm 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 0.0 0.0 
Farm gate price (social) (Tg) 41392 36046 53146 32246 40796 50296 800 1560 
Density (kg/I) 0.84 0.72 
7.8. Credit 
Credit for farmers is available through an agricultural bank. Interest rates at November 1992 were in 
the region of 36% to 40% which, with inflation at 60%, allowed farmers to borrow at negative real 
rates thereby providing subsidised credit. The private cost of working capital is therefore negative. 
The agricultural bank is one of the larger lending institutions in Mongolia. Loans are available for 
both fixed capital investments and working capital although the uptake of the former has been 
generally low because of the tendency to disinvest in farm machinery at the present time. Working 
capital credit is typically taken for a period of 1 to 6 months and is secured on livestock and/or 
machinery (and in some cases on buildings). As with many other infant services in Mongolia there is 
a lack of experience of good professional expertise in banking. Although the theory of assessing 
credit risk, appraising investment viability etc. has been addressed it will take time for bankers to 
develop and hone these skills. The negative real rates mean that the incidence of bad debts has been 
so far low (a figure of 4% has been suggested). 
It appears that, at least in some sectors, the banking practices tend to favour state-owned enterprises. 
Another problem, arising from the negative real interest rates, is that deposits by savers are low and 
this is leading to a shortage of credit. This has serious implications for producers who are faced with 
the need to secure inputs timeously. In some cases the problem may be one of lack of availability of 
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the inputs themselves. In other cases shortage of credit means that the purchase cannot be made. In 
the past state farms received credit in the form of advance payments from the mills, amounting to 
between 25 and 70% of the total value of the contract. 
The social cost of capital has been set at a figure of 14% per annum. This is set at a level to reflect a 
reasonable rate with premiums to account for risk and transaction costs. 
7.9. Labour 
The amount of labour conventionally used in the production of wheat has been estimated using 
records held at the MoA. The staff complement is assumed to consist of one manager together with 8 
full time, skilled workers (mainly tractor driving). Casual labour, employed at harvest time is the only 
other form of on-farm labour. 
As a purely domestic factor of production the social value of labour is notoriously difficult to 
estimate. Contributing to this difficulty are following issues: 
e The highly seasonal nature of farm production means that the marginal value product of a unit of 
labour can depend on when that labour is available. Monoculture systems in particular exhibit 
highly peaked labour demands usually around sowing and harvest time. The opportunity cost of 
labour at these times can be very high indeed. In Mongolian crop farming the pattern of 
development has involved the substitution of capital for labour. 
• Unwaged labour is often found in family units. On the State Farms all the workers were waged 
employees and also received other benefits in kind. Where new forms of business structure 
emerge and these structures are such that the workers enjoy some form of stake in the business 
then there is often an incentive to the 
a In the long run labour can move into and out of agriculture. Thus the time scale to which the 
analysis refers will have a bearing on the estimated social value of labour. 
Problems of transition present some particularly difficult problems for the policy analyst when 
attempting to value labour. If we assume that the social value of labour is defined as the next most 
attractive means of using that labour (i.e. the opportunity cost) then we must identify such an activity. 
The Mongolian economy has suffered some major shocks over the last two years and as a result the 
general level of economic activity, as measured by GDP, has fallen. The country is in the 
unfortunate position of seeing increasing rates unemployment and at the same time serious shortages 
of basic consumer goods. It will take time and prudent economic management to remedy this 
situation by putting labour back to work in a productive manner. In the meantime the immediate 
prospects for alternative uses of labour are not good and so one would surmise that the opportunity 
cost of labour would therefore be low. The problem is determining just how low is low. 
Conventional wisdom has it that agriculture is one of the first sectors to respond favourably to 
transition to a market economy. This is probably based in part on experience with the household 
responsibility system in China which brought about substantial improvements in farm productivity 
during the 1980's. Such an analogy is inappropriate for the State Farm sector in Mongolia which 
owes more to industrial organisational structures than to family-based farm holdings. If this assertion 
were true, however, then the effect would be that marginal value products for labour would rise 
fastest in agriculture. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is certainly not the case at the present 
time. 
The DRC ratio is calculated using the formula 
social value of domestic factors DRC ratio 
value added at social prices 
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in other words, the social value of domestic resources needed to earn (or save, through import 
substitution) one unit of foreign exchange. 
A value less than 1 suggests that the system earns super-normal profits and enjoys a comparative 
advantage. Obviously both the quantity and estimated social value of domestic resources need 
realistic before such a judgement is made. The irony of this type of analysis is that a low (or zero) 
opportunity cost will tend to increase the apparent comparative advantage of the commodity system. 
As the value of domestic resources become closer to zero so the DRC ratio approaches zero also. 
This has the effect of diminishing the value of the measure as an indicator of economic efficiency. Its 
only value in this case is for comparison when it can be used to asses the relative performance of 
systems in which domestic resources have been valued on the same basis. 
Under these conditions a more satisfactory approach when considering multi-commodity farming 
systems is use mathematical programming to investigate issues of economic efficiency. Optimising 
techniques such as linear programming and its derivatives offer the analyst the possibility of 
constructing models of the farm systems using both private and social prices for factors and products 
(Gotsch, 1989). Despite the problems associated with aggregation of indicative farm models, the 
formulation of optimal farm plans based on these price systems can yield valuable insights into the 
welfare losses arising from policy induced divergences. 
In the specific case of Mongolian agriculture it would be necessary to construct input-output budgets 
for other activities which require arable land most notably fodder crops for animals. Because the 
fodder is an intermediate product in the production process it will be necessary to estimate input-
output coefficients for the complete livestock activities until a market for traded fodder develops. 
Even then, some kinds of fodder are not traded because they do not transport easily (e.g. silage) or the 
costs of doing so would be such that transport over large distances would be uneconomic. 
Data from interviews with members of recently (semi-) privatised farms provided an estimated for a 
monthly wage of around Tg 3,500. At the official wage rate this is equivalent to US$ 87.50 but only 
US$ 23 at the shadow rate. The estimation of the social value of labour therefore remains a serious 
problem at the present time. 
7.10. Land 
The problems associated with the economic valuation of land are similar to those affecting labour 
only worse. To date neither land nor the right to use it has been traded and so there is no private 
market that can be used as a starting place for valuation. Under the socialist system, the ownership 
of land was firmly retained in state hands. Individuals were not allowed ownership of land and this 
remains the case at the present time. With the privatisation of land-using sectors the state has 
assumed the role of landlord and land lease legislation has been enacted to facilitate the 
establishment of agricultural tenancies. In part the letting of land is seen as a potential source of 
government revenue and to this end the AERI has been charged with the development of a coherent 
system for determining rental values based on the productive capacity of land (ADB, 1992) 
During 1992 the average annual rent for cereal crop land was Tg 50 per ha. In the light of the price 
paid for wheat (Tg 7000 per tonne) this is a very low figure indeed and it probably reflects historic 
rather than current prices. 
Land use practices which damage the environment are a cost to society and strictly need to be 
captured within a social valuation of land as a factor of production. 
Even in economies in which there is a mature land market, there are problems in estimating a social 
value of land. For example, subsidies to farmers, which are transfer payments, often become 
capitalised into land values. 
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8. RESULTS 
The following results are based on simple 'what if?' analyses using the data in table 26. below as a 
baseline position. Particular emphasis has been paid to the relationship between performance 
indicators and: 
• Yield levels and rotations; 
• Transport costs for imported wheat; 
s Distance of farm from population centres; 
For the reasons outlined elsewhere greater weight can be given to the valuation of traded items in the 
commodity than to that of domestic factors. Intermediate measures such as value-added will 
therefore be more reliable than the more complete estimates of profitability. 
The baseline assumptions for the model are shown in table 27 with the results in table 28. This is 
based on a typical farm situation in either Tuv or Selenge aimags. 
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Table 27. Baseline assumptions within the model 
GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Exchange rate Official 40 Tg/US$ 
Shadow 150 Tg/US$ 
Exchange premium 3.75 
Import duty on machinery 15 % 
Interest rate - private short term 40 % 
Inflation rate 60 % 
Real rate of interest -12.5 % 
Social cost of capital 14 % 
FARM VARIABLES 
Distance of farm from processing site 100 kms 
Distance of farm from Ulaan Baatar 200 kms 
Distance of processing site from Ulaan Baatar 150 kms 
Area of fallow associated with 1 ha wheat 0.50 ha 
Number of days credit required 150 
OUTPUT 
Harvested yield 1.20 t/ha 
Moisture content of harvested grain 18 % 
Moisture content of imported grain 14 % 
Yield at 14% moisture 1.14 t/ha 
Post harvest losses 5 % 
Saleable yield 1.09 t/ha 
Grain Prop (%) Discount (%) 
quality Class 1 2 15 
Class II 58 0 
Sub-standard 40 -10 
INPUTS 
Seed rate 200 kg/ha 
Fertilizer Nutrient rate Active sub Amount 
kg/ha % kg/ha 
N = Ammonium Nitrate 40 34 118 
P = Triple Superphosphate 21 47 45 
K = Potassium Chloride 11 60 18 
Wheat Fallow 
Sprays - 2,4-D 1 0.5 litres/ha 
Seed treatment 1.5 litres/t 
Private Social 
Labour Management 6000 6000 Tg/month 
Full time staff 3500 3500 Tg/month 
Casual labour 100 75 Tg/day 
Land 50 Tg/ha rent 
Figures in bold type can be altered by the policy analyst. 
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Table 28. Commodity budget based on the baseline assumptions 
Private Social 
OUTPUT units units/ha Tg/unit Tg/ha Tg/unit Tg/ha 
Grain Class I t 0.02 8050 175 47601 1035 
Class II t 0.63 7000 4413 41392 26095 
Sub-standard t 0.43 6300 2739 37253 16197 
Straw t 
Total 7327 43327 
TRADED INPUTS units units/ha Tg/unit Tg/ha Tg/unit Tg/ha 
Seed kg 200 7.0 1400 41.4 8278 
Fertiliser Amm N kg 118 10.8 1271 36.0 4241 
SP kg 45 12.8 572 40.8 1823 
KCl kg 18 8.8 161 32.2 591 
Diesel litres 75 9.1 678 34.3 2562 
Petrol litres 6 19.3 116 36.2 217 
Electricity KWhr 12 5.0 60 10.0 120 
Sprays litres 1.3 200.8 251 799.8 1000 
Repairs Tg 1198 4950 
DEPRECIATION units units/ha 
Machinery Tg 1239 5119 
Buildings and plant Tg 62 257 
Total traded 7009 29157 
Value Added 319 14170 
DOMESTIC FACTORS units units/ha Tg/unit Tg/ha Tg/unit Tg/ha 
Labour 
Managers man-months 0.012 6000 72 6000 72 
Full-time workers man-months 0.096 3500 336 3500 336 
Seed dressing man-days 0.010 100 1 75 1 
Buildings Tg 45 185 
Capital 
Interest on working capital -293 328 
Interest on durable capital 1062 4388 
Land 50 
Profit -954 8860 
Summary of PAM Indicators 
Measures of protection 
Nominal Protection Coefficient on tradable OUTPUTS 0.17 
Nominal Protection Coefficient on tradable INPUTS 0.24 
Effective Protection Coefficient 0.02 
Measures of efficiency 
Private Profitablity Coefficient 3.99 
Domestic Resource Cost ratio 0.37 
Wheat production In Mongolia: an economic analysis ' Page 43 
The measures of protection show negative protection in both factor and product markets, which, in 
the case of factors, acts as a subsidy to producers. The divergence (tax) in the output market is the 
greater however and results from low, fixed producer prices. 
As far as efficiency measures are concerned, private profit levels are currently negative if the 
replacement costs of the full machinery complement is included. In practice very little machinery 
and buildings have been replaced in the last few years thereby permitting small, positive margins. 
This scenario can be easily modelled by removing these items from the budget. If this is done then a 
small profit can be shown in those areas in which yield levels are high enough (see table 29). 
Fertiliser use has also declined markedly in the last two years resulting in lower yields. It is as yet too 
early to assess the long term effect of this but it is extremely unlikely that output can be sustained 
without recourse to the use of fertilisers again. 
Table 29. Estimates of profit with and without machinery replacement costs 
Aimag Yield (t ha"1) Crop:fallow (:1) 
Private profit (Tg per ha) 
with without 
Social profit (Tg per ha) 
with without 
Selenge 1.2 1.7S -982 1426 8745 18694 
Tuv 1.3 1:10 -S41 1868 11663 21612 
Bulgan 1.3 1.30 -450 1959 12036 21985 
Uvs 1.0 1.70 -2210 198 1496 11445 
Hentii 1.0 1.00 -2373 36 832 10780 
Dornod 0.9 0.90 -3027 -618 -2958 6990 
Non-replacement of machinery is only practicable in the short term and to the extent that there is 
existing over-capacity. This is a matter of some conjecture in that it is impossible to say what 
proportion of the total machinery inventory is actually operational. With the present difficulties in 
obtaining spare parts it is most probable that the number of serviceable machines in use is declining 
rapidly. 
Table 30. The relationship between transport costs, yield and social profit 
Social profitability (Tg per ha) 
Yield tha"1 Transport costs from Tianjin to Ulaan Baatar (US$ per tonne) 
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
0.70 -13874 -13094 -12314 -11533 -10753 -9973 -9193 -8413 -7633 
0.80 -11258 -10312 -9366 -8420 -7474 -6528 -5582 -4636 -3690 
0.90 -8641 -7530 -6418 -5307 -4195 -3083 -1972 -860 252 
1.00 -6025 -4748 -3471 -2193 -916 362 1639 2916 4194 
1.10 -3409 -1966 -523 920 2363 3806 5250 6693 8136 
1.20 -793 816 2425 4034 5642 7251 8860 10469 12078 
1.30 1823 3598 5372 7147 8922 10696 12471 14245 16020 
1.40 4439 6380 8320 10260 12201 14141 16081 18022 19962 
1.50 7056 9162 11268 13374 15480 17586 19692 21798 23904 
The results in Table 30. provide an indication of the impact of two important determinants of social 
profitability, namely the crop yield and the cost of importing wheat. At a freight cost of $80 per 
tonne wheat appears to be just profitable at 1.0 tonnes per ha. This transport cost is excessively high 
and is likely to drop in the long term if rail links are upgraded and the volume of trade with and 
through China increases. At US$40 per tonne the activity is barely break-even at 1.2 tonnes per ha. 
Unless efficiency gains can be made then case for growing wheat on all but the very best land 
becomes extremely weak. 
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This study has provided a framework for further investigation of the of mechanised arable farming in 
Mongolia. In particular the approach adopted, i.e. that of desegregating the components of the 
commodity system should allow the evaluation of specific geographical and agronomic scenarios in 
which superior data are available. 
Because of difficulties in quantifying certain elements of the production system together with the 
transient (sic) and often unpredictable nature of economic transition, the results should be treated 
with caution. However a number of valuable insights into the international competitiveness of this 
sector do emerge from the exercise and it is hoped that the work done in developing this approach 
may act as a resource to others wishing to study this subject. 
Wheat production in Mongolia has been demonstrated to be a marginal activity both because of the 
low level of output and the degree of risk involved. However, there are other areas of the world, 
with similar physical conditions, in which superior performance has been consistently obtained. We 
may reasonable conclude therefore that, given an advantageous economic and policy environment 
and the appropriate technological packages, performance could be raised on much of the land 
currently cropped. It is also important to remember that with the present high costs of transporting 
grain to Mongolia the economic case for domestic production is actually strengthened. Investment in 
improving transport links to China will be necessary for the development of the Mongolian economy 
in the years to come. This will reduce the cif cost of imported goods and so undermine this position. 
The current systems of production are undergoing rapid disinvestment as a result of the loss of 
economic and technical assistance from former CMEA countries. During much of the 1980's yields 
of wheat were around 1.2 t ha"1. It is important to realise that this was achieved with substantial 
amounts of imported fertiliser and other inputs. The established methods of production are highly 
dependent on imported inputs which were often inefficiently used. Given the present trade 
arrangements there is considerable doubt as to the economic sustainability of the existing methods of 
production. 
Capital productivity is, in reality, very low but historically this has been hidden by means of the 
accounting systems used and existence of the soft budget constraint (i.e. the practice of not allowing 
the bankruptcy of state enterprises). The present financial position of many State Farms is precarious, 
as a result of both poor performance on the farm and the need to operate with a price system that acts 
as a subsidy to consumers and a tax upon producers. Despite the recent price reforms to date there 
remains a high degree of distortion principally as a result of the overvalued domestic currency. The 
problems of price inflation and unpredictability of supply serve to reinforce the problem. 
The existing scale of wheat production was the result of a drive to achieve self-sufficiency. Thus the 
issue of food security is worthy of consideration in this context. In the past the main problem was 
that there was usually no surplus wheat within the CMEA and so imports required scarce hard 
currency. Such was the political and economic cohesion between Mongolia and the USSR that 
importing the inputs required to grow wheat was quite straightforward. (Until very recently 5% of the 
population were CMEA expatriates, most Russian military personnel). The shift from this to the 
present arrangement in which all imports require payment to be made in hard currency means that a 
new set decisions arise. In simple terms the choice is whether to import the wheat or (most of) the 
inputs required to grow it. The food security argument from a strategic stance is only partially 
tenable in that the means of the production are largely imported themselves. Shortage of adequate 
grain storage capacity and the tendency for grain to deteriorate in storage further undermine the logic 
of attempting to further increase the area of land devoted to domestic production. 
As recently as 1991, the Mongolian authorities intended to meet the demand for grain needs by 
extending the land area and raising yields (Sloane et al, 1991 pp 29-30). It is very unlikely that the 
cropping of additional would be either economically viable or ecologically desirable. The best 
arable land is currently in use and any new land brought into production using the present 
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technology will probably be incapable of growing wheat profitably. This is unlikely to be the 
answer. The following recommendations outline some possible means by which these problems can 
be addressed 
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10. RECOMMENDATIONS 
On the basis of the findings of this study the following recommendations are offered in the hope that 
they may help guide further thinking on this important subject. An obvious prerequisite to all of the 
following suggestions is the strengthening of the national capacity for agricultural policy analysis 
combined with an effective means of assessing the potential for and impact of technical change in 
agriculture. The PALD project is assisting in attaining this objective, especially in the livestock 
sector. 
i) More detailed work is required on the nature of inefficiencies in the existing production systems. 
This should be followed up by the design of strategies for addressing these problems. Some of 
this could take the form of training and guidance and implementing low-cost appropriate 
solutions without the need for large scale capital investment. Within the present production 
systems some practices stand out as being badly done and would show a good response to well 
targeted training (for example crop spraying). 
ii) On the premise that a proportion of the wheat crop is farmed using unsuitable methods, there is a 
need to identify and test improved agronomic packages. These could include: reduced tillage 
systems with more efficient fallowing and improved rotations incorporating the use of 
complementary fodder crops. Minimal tillage systems require fewer inputs such as machinery 
and fuel but are more difficult to manage. Careful consideration of the potential adoption of such 
systems needs to made before embarking on research, development and extension based on these 
systems. 
iii) Storage losses are also serious. The current state of grain processing and storage requires 
investigation. There is insufficient storage capacity to cover the entire domestic requirements. 
Given this situation, it may be appropriate to reduce production to bring it into line with existing 
storage capacity and import the balance. This reduction would be focused on the most marginal 
land and so the reduction in land area devoted to wheat production would be pro rata greater. 
Where the social value added (using imported tradables only) is negative, this move will actually 
save foreign exchange. 
iv) It is worth considering the option of taking out of production the most marginal areas. A 
judgement needs to be made as to viability of improving the efficiency of the system or whether a 
change of land use is more prudent. The wheat production model provides a means of assessing 
the specific characteristics of a farm situation. With the use of farm-specific, superior data the 
policy analyst can test assess the impact of various policy scenarios within define geographical 
and agro-climatic contexts. For example, it can help identify situations in which social value 
added is negative in which case there is an argument for the reallocation of fixed resources to 
more profitable activities. 
v) The producer price for wheat in 1992 was well below the c.i.f. world price and so this transfer 
acts as a tax on producers. The over-valued exchange rate provides producers with an degree of 
subsidy on imported inputs which in part counteracts the negative protection in the output 
market. The establishment of a coherent, stable and equitable price policy for agricultural 
producers will do much to improve confidence in this sector and promote more economically 
efficient resource allocation. 
vi) Shortage of foreign exchange and unpredictability of input supply have further aggravated what is 
already a risky activity. This perception of risk acts as severe deterrent to farm privatisation and 
new investment in agriculture. Measures to improve the reliability of farm input supply will be 
needed to ensure business viability in this sector regardless of the actual business structures. In 
particular, the activities of monopolies and monopsonies will require close monitoring. 
vii) The economic analysis of wheat production along the lines developed in this study is new to 
Mongolia. In order to investigate the entire agricultural sector in a more thorough and systematic 
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manner, it would be valuable to construct similar commodity budgets for other significant 
commodity production systems. This would facilitate the estimation of opportunity costs of 
agricultural resources. Such models could be used to investigate the issues of comparative 
advantage in agriculture (for example, to assess the case for growing more fodder crops and less 
wheat) as well as providing a valuable resource for project planning and assessing the impact of 
economic policy. The fundamental question to be answered is whether wheat is the most 
appropriate crop in a given farm context and this require a sound method for evaluating the 
alternatives, principal amongst which is fodder production. This represents the next step for this 
study. 
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